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Regulation	and	the	courts:	judicial	review	in	comparative	
perspective	
Francesca	Bignami	
Chapter	10	in:	Comparative	Law	and	Regulation:	Understanding	the	Global	Regulatory	Process	
(Francesca	Bignami	&	David	Zaring	eds.,	Edward	Elgar	2016)
INTRODUCTION	
The	public	law	of	government	intervention	in	economy	and	society	has	a	long	history	that	has	
been	driven	by	the	politics	of	democratization	and	state	formation	and	that	has	had	profound	
consequences	for	the	legitimacy	and	effectiveness	of	the	contemporary	administrative	state.	In	
large	part,	this	public	law	has	been	identified	with	judicial	review	and	the	courts:	on	what	grounds	
will	 a	 court	 find	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 political	 and	 administrative	 organs	 of	 the	 state	 to	 be	
unlawful?	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 considerable	 body	 of	 comparative	 scholarship	 has	 sought	 to	
capture	 variation	 in	 judicial	 redress	 in	 different	 legal	 systems.	 The	 premise	 of	 much	 of	 the	
comparative	 scholarship	 is	 that	 liberal	 societies	 can	 share	 roughly	 similar	 commitments	 to	
principles	such	as	the	rule	of	law	and	fundamental	rights	but	can	seek	to	safeguard	such	principles	
through	different	types	of	courts	and	legal	doctrines.	The	thought	 is	that,	by	appreciating	the	
differences,	it	is	possible	to	obtain	a	better	understanding	of	the	legal	and	political	operation	of	
government	policymaking	both	at	home	and	abroad	and	to	engage	in	constructive	thinking	on	
the	proper	design	of	law,	courts,	and	the	administrative	state.		
This	chapter	is	designed	as	both	a	review	of	the	comparative	literature	on	judicial	review	
and	as	an	original	contribution	to	that	literature.	It	presents	two	important	contrasts	that	have	
been	drawn	between	systems	of	public	law	in	western	countries	and	proposes	a	third	based	on	
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my	own	research.	The	purpose	is	to	develop	a	comparative	blueprint	that	can	help	the	reader	
navigate	public	policymaking	and	the	courts	in	different	jurisdictions	across	the	globe.	While	the	
three	 classifications	 covered	 in	 this	 chapter	 overlap	 in	 certain	 respects,	 they	 are	 mostly	
complementary,	not	competing,	and	therefore	taken	together	they	create	a	multi-dimensional	
and	fairly	complete	picture	of	the	landscape	of	judicial	review.		Most	of	the	discussion	applies	
broadly	to	the	activities	of	the	administrative	state,	not	specifically	to	the	regulatory	function,	
since	 the	 public	 law	 of	 most	 countries	 does	 not	 expressly	 draw	 such	 distinctions.	 	 Mindful,	
however,	of	the	larger	purposes	of	this	volume,	the	chapter	also	highlights	the	implications	for	
regulation	where	appropriate.	
The	 chapter	proceeds	 as	 follows.	 The	next	 section	presents	one	of	 the	 first	 and	most	
enduring	 contrasts	 that	 has	 been	 drawn	 between	 systems	 of	 public	 law	 and	 judicial	 review:		
judicial	review	of	administrative	action	by	the	ordinary	courts	in	the	English	common	law	and	by	
a	 special	 body	 (Conseil	 d’Etat)	 connected	 to	 the	 executive	 branch	 in	 the	 French	 droit	
administratif.	Initially	identified	by	the	English	scholar	A.V.	Dicey	in	the	late	nineteenth	century,	
the	 common	 law–droit	 administratif	 divide	 has	 since	 been	 re-examined	 and	 re-assessed	 by	
several	 generations	 of	 comparative	 scholars	 (Dicey,	 1885;	 Goodnow,	 1893;	 Garner,	 1924;	
Schwartz,	1949;	Mitchell,	1965;	Brown	and	Garner,	1967;	Breyer,	1993;	Brown	and	Bell,	1998).	
The	following	section	turns	to	the	difference	between	the	litigious	and	formal	American	system	
of	 law	 and	 public	 policy	 and	 the	 informal	 and	 discretionary	 European	 policy	 process.	 These	
categories	of	difference	are	largely	the	brainchild	of	Robert	Kagan	and	his	theory	of	American	
“adversarial	 legalism”	 (1991,	 1994,	 1997,	 2001),	 although	 they	 have	 also	 been	 developed	 in	
rational-choice	scholarship	on	policymaking	in	the	American	presidential	system	of	government	
and	European	parliamentary	systems	(Moe	and	Caldwell,	1994;	Epstein	and	O’Halloran,	1999:	
242–44;	Thies,	2001;	Jensen	and	McGrath,	2011;	Rose-Ackerman	et	al.,	2015;	Rose-Ackerman	et	
al.,	this	volume).	In	the	last	section,	I	propose	a	third	major	contrast	between	systems	of	public	
law	in	the	regulatory	domain:	judicial	review	informed	by	theories	of	fundamental	economic	and	
social	rights	in	Europe,	as	illustrated	by	the	doctrines	of	proportionality	and	equality,	and	judicial	
review	designed	to	promote	a	democratic	and	participatory	administrative	process	in	the	United	
States,	what	I	call	the	“ballot-box	democracy”	paradigm	of	public	law.	I	argue	that	this	divide	has	
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the	 potential	 to	 extend	 to	 other	 jurisdictions	 in	 light	 of	 the	 global	 diffusion	 of	 written	
constitutions	and	constitutional	courts	(Ginsburg,	2008).	In	exploring	the	three	classifications	of	
national	systems	of	judicial	review,	each	section	examines	their	historical	origins	and	draws	out	
their	 normative	 implications.	 Each	 section	 also	 considers	 the	 implications	 of	 these	
classifications—developed	in	the	more	general	context	of	the	administrative	state—specifically	
for	regulation,	which	is	defined	in	the	sense	of	this	book	as	rule-based	governance	by	specialized	
administrative	authorities	under	the	supervision	of	the	legislature,	the	political	executive,	and	
the	courts.			
Before	continuing,	one	point	of	clarification	is	in	order.	The	first	question	that	is	likely	to	
come	to	mind	is	where	this	discussion	of	judicial	review	fits	in	the	conventional	breakdown	of	the	
legal	 discipline―constitutional	 or	 administrative	 law?	 Although	 the	 distinction	 may	 seem	
obvious,	as	it	turns	out,	different	jurisdictions	and	the	different	subfields	themselves	employ	their	
own	 criteria	 to	 delineate	 what	 law	 is	 covered.	While	 constitutional	 lawyers	 tend	 to	 include	
anything	that	is	contained	in	a	particular	source	of	law,	that	is,	the	Constitution,	administrative	
lawyers	focus	on	the	law	that	is	applied	to	a	particular	type	of	government	institution,	that	is,	
public	administration.	But	the	focus	of	this	volume	and	chapter	is	neither	a	legal	source	nor	a	
government	institution.	Rather	it	is	a	particular	domain	of	state	activity,	i.e.,	regulation,	which	
can	involve	both	legislative	and	administrative	action,	and	how	courts	intervene	in	that	domain,	
which	can	be	based	upon	both	constitutional	and	secondary	sources	of	law.	With	the	exception	
of	the	next	section,	therefore,	this	chapter	covers	both	constitutional	and	administrative	law.	The	
next	 section	 on	 the	 early	 common	 law–droit	 administratif	 divide	 is	 the	 exception	 because	 it	
focuses	exclusively	on	administrative	law.	The	reason	for	the	early	emphasis	on	administrative	
law	is	fairly	simple:	until	World	War	II,	administrative	law	was	the	only	form	of	litigated	public	
law	in	most	western	jurisdictions,	and	even	after	World	War	II,	when	constitutional	courts	were	
established	in	a	number	of	European	countries,	it	was	decades	before	a	thick	law	and	practice	of	
constitutional	adjudication	took	hold	(Stone,	1992:	225–53).	
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COMMON	LAW	VERSUS	DROIT	ADMINISTRATIF	
	
In	the	annals	of	comparative	public	law,	the	difference	between	administrative	litigation	in	the	
common	law	and	the	droit	administratif	traditions	is	one	of	oldest	and	most	enduring	sources	of	
debate	and	scholarship.	In	the	liberal	model	that	took	hold	across	Europe	in	the	late	nineteenth	
century,	the	concept	of	the	rule	of	law	was	central	(Mannori	and	Sordi,	2001;	Stolleis,	2001).	The	
existence	of	a	private	sphere	of	liberty,	separate	from	public	power,	was	to	be	guaranteed	by	a	
system	of	government	that	respected	the	rule	of	law:		individuals	enjoyed	rights	independent	of	
the	state,	any	state	action	had	to	be	authorized	by	law,	and	citizens	had	to	be	able	to	go	to	the	
courts	to	obtain	relief	against	overreaching	state	action.	Yet	despite	the	spread	of	the	political	
philosophy	 of	 liberalism,	 there	 were	 fundamental	 differences	 in	 how	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 was	
operationalized	in	England	and	France,	two	of	the	most	powerful	nation	states	of	the	time.	As	
the	English	scholar	A.V.	Dicey	famously	pointed	out	in	Law	of	the	Constitution	(1885),	France	had	
a	separate	system	of	justice	for	obtaining	redress	against	government	actors	in	which	officials	
had	to	be	sued	in	a	special	court	(Conseil	d’Etat)	and	according	to	a	special	set	of	legal	doctrines.	
By	contrast,	government	officials	in	England	were	held	accountable	to	the	law	before	the	same	
courts	and	under	 the	same	 legal	principles	as	private	 individuals.	The	common	 law	model,	 in	
Dicey’s	analysis,	was	clearly	the	better	guarantor	of	the	rule	of	law	and	the	rights	of	individuals	
(Allison,	1996:	11;	 Lindseth,	2005).	 It	was	also	a	 reflection	of	 a	deep-rooted,	historical	divide	
between	 the	 limited	 government	 and	 liberty-driven	 tradition	 of	 the	 common	 law	 and	 the	
absolutism	of	 the	Continent	which,	 in	Dicey’s	view,	prevailed	even	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	political	
transformations	of	the	nineteenth	century.	In	other	words,	the	common	law	model	was	what	a	
contemporary	comparativist	might	call	the	“better”	law	(Zweigert	and	Kötz,	1998:	47),	not	just	
because	of	the	niceties	of	legal	forms,	organization,	and	remedies	but	because	it	was	the	mark	
of	a	superior	 legal	tradition	deeply	committed	to	individual	 liberties,	 limited	government,	and	
the	rule	of	law.		
The	common	law–droit	administratif	divide	pronounced	by	Dicey	has	been	both	highly	
influential	 and	 enormously	 controversial	 (Allison,	 1996:	 19–23).	 Perhaps	 the	 most	 widely	
accepted	aspect	of	Dicey’s	analysis	has	been	his	view	of	the	historical	origins	of	the	two	models.	
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As	with	many	other	differences	between	the	English	common	 law	and	the	 law	of	continental	
Europe,	the	timing	of	the	centralization	of	state	power	appears	to	have	been	critical.	Compared	
with	 continental	 Europe,	 political	 power	 was	 consolidated	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 monarchy	
relatively	early	in	England,	in	some	accounts	as	far	back	as	the	Norman	Conquest	(Ertman,	1997).	
This	 early	 state	 took	 the	 form	of	 a	 centralized	 system	of	 law	 and	 courts	 but	 a	 decentralized	
administration	that	rested	on	local	dignitaries	serving	on	various	lay	bodies	and	as	justices	of	the	
peace,	 as	 the	 office	 would	 later	 be	 called	 (Lovell,	 1962;	 Van	 Caenegem,	 1998).	 Although	
industrialization	 and	other	 social	 and	 economic	 pressures	 produced	 significant	 growth	 in	 the	
administrative	capacity	of	the	state,	the	early	configuration	of	centralized,	common	law	courts	
and	 decentralized	 administration	 remains	 essential	 to	 understanding	 the	 institutions	 of	 the	
British	state	(Cassese,	2010).	This	is	particularly	true	with	respect	to	the	absence	of	a	specialized	
system	of	administrative	justice.	At	various	junctures,	the	common	law	bar	successfully	resisted	
pressure	to	transfer	power	over	public	litigation	from	the	common	law	courts	to	an	alternative	
set	of	courts	that	would	have	had	exclusive	jurisdiction	over	claims	against	public	actors.1		
In	France,	by	contrast,	the	consolidation	of	state	power	occurred	almost	four	centuries	
later,	at	a	time	when	it	was	both	technologically	possible	and	politically	necessary	to	develop	a	
centralized	 administration	 and	 a	 special	 jurisdiction	 to	 hear	 complaints	 against	 that	
administration.	As	has	been	recounted	by	others,	the	origins	of	the	Conseil	d’Etat	can	be	found	
in	the	Ancien	Régime	and	absolutism	(Mannori	and	Sordi,	2001;	Zoller,	2008).	During	the	1600s	
and	1700s,	royal	administrators	in	the	provinces,	known	as	intendants,	acquired	greater	powers	
and	administrative	capacity	as	the	monarchy	sought	to	assert	control	over	the	nobility	and	other	
local	 elites.	One	major	 obstacle,	 however,	 to	 this	 form	of	 centralized	 administration	was	 the	
regional	courts	(Parlements).	Composed	of	local	dignitaries,	the	Parlements	used	their	powers	to	
refuse	the	registration	of	royal	ordinances,	thereby	denying	them	effect,	and	to	hear	complaints	
against	the	royal	administrators.	In	response	to	this	interference,	the	monarchy	sought	to	give	a	
special,	central	body	known	as	the	King’s	Council	(Conseil	du	Roi)	exclusive	jurisdiction	to	hear	
cases	 against	 the	administration.	 The	Parlements,	 however,	 persisted	 in	 asserting	 jurisdiction	
																																								 																				
1	Perhaps	the	best	known	episode	is	the	defeat	of	the	Star	Chamber	during	the	English	Revolution	(Mitchell,	1965:	
96–97).	
Bignami—Regulation	and	the	Courts	
	
6	
	
over	 claims	 against	 the	 intendants	 and	 conflict	 between	 the	 two	 sets	 of	 judicial	 authorities	
continued	until	the	Revolution.			
After	 the	 Revolution,	 administrative	 disputes	 continued	 to	 be	 heard	 by	 a	 special	
jurisdiction	connected	to	the	executive	branch,	but	now	without	competition	from	the	courts.	
The	decision	to	establish	the	Conseil	d’Etat,	in	many	respects	the	successor	to	the	Conseil	du	Roi,	
was	the	reflection	of	two	powerful	ideological	threads	running	through	the	Revolution.	The	first	
was	the	delegitimization	of	courts	because	of	their	association	with	the	special	privileges	and	
powerful	local	elites	of	the	Ancien	Régime.	The	second	was	the	glorification	of	the	general	will	
and	the	republican	form	of	government	and	the	desire	to	shield	the	political	expression	of	the	
general	will,	in	the	legislature	and	the	administration,	from	the	meddling	of	the	courts.	The	oft-
repeated	aphorism	that	“juger	est	encore	administrer”	(to	judge	is	still	to	administer)	expresses	
the	distinctive	separation	of	powers	doctrine	espoused	during	the	Revolution	and	afterwards:	
the	balance	between	the	three	powers	was	at	greatest	risk	from	the	judicial	branch	and	therefore	
oversight	of	the	administration	could	not	be	entrusted	to	the	ordinary	courts	but	had	to	be	vested	
in	 a	 special	 body	 connected	 to	 the	 executive.	 In	 sum,	 in	 both	 the	 Ancien	 Régime	 and	 the	
Revolution,	centralized	administration	and	a	specialized	 jurisdiction	to	oversee	administration	
were	 essential	 to	 the	 consolidation	 of	 political	 authority,	 at	 first	 in	 the	 name	 of	 absolute	
monarchy	and	later	in	the	name	of	republicanism.			
The	 configuration	 of	 administrative	 justice	 has	 changed	 considerably	 since	 Dicey	 first	
wrote	but	 there	are	still	 important	differences	 in	how	challenges	 to	administrative	action	are	
brought	 in	 England	 and	 France	 and,	 more	 broadly,	 the	 many	 jurisdictions	 that	 have	 been	
influenced	by	the	common	law	and	droit	administratif	models.2	To	understand	these	differences,	
it	is	necessary	to	briefly	trace	the	evolution	of	the	two	systems.	When	it	was	originally	established	
in	1804,	the	Conseil	d’Etat	resembled	more	closely	an	executive	advisory	body	than	a	full-fledged	
court.	By	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	however,	the	reverse	was	the	case:	its	procedure	
had	been	judicialized,	it	had	acquired	mandatory	jurisdiction	over	disputes	brought	against	the	
administration,	its	judgments	had	become	final	and	were	no	longer	styled	as	recommendations	
																																								 																				
2Australia,	New	Zealand,	India,	Ireland,	and	the	United	States	belong	to	the	common	law	tradition	while	Belgium,	
the	 Netherlands,	 Luxembourg,	 Italy,	 Greece,	 Turkey,	 Lebanon,	 Egypt,	 Columbia,	 Morocco,	 Algeria,	 and	 Senegal	
belong	to	the	droit	administratif	tradition	(Bignami,	2011:	92).	
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to	the	head	of	state,	and	its	members	had,	as	a	matter	of	custom,	acquired	independence	from	
the	 government	 (Brown	 and	 Bell,	 1998:	 47–50).	 In	 a	 set	 of	 developments	 that	 occurred	
somewhat	later,	the	English	system	of	administrative	justice	became	more	specialized.	Beginning	
in	 the	 early	 1900s,	 administrative	 tribunals	were	 established	within	 the	 bureaucracy	 to	 hear	
individual	claims	in	areas	such	as	welfare	policy	and	labor	and	employment	law	(Cane,	2009:	30).	
Although	tribunal	decisions	were	technically	subject	to	review	by	the	common	law	courts,	the	
system	of	administrative	tribunals	was	largely	free-standing,	with	very	little	interference,	even	
on	points	of	law,	from	the	ordinary	courts.	Just	as	important,	a	number	of	changes	have	been	
made	 to	 the	 common	 law	 system	 of	 access	 to	 justice,	 discovery,	 and	 remedies	 to	 facilitate	
challenges	against	administrative	authorities,	resulting	in	a	litigation	model	tailored	specifically	
to	obtaining	redress	against	public	actors	(Allison,	1996:	23–29).		
Despite	 these	 transformations,	 there	 remain	 a	 couple	 of	 key	differences	 that	 fall	 into	
roughly	 two	 categories―organizational	 and	 doctrinal.	 On	 the	 organizational	 front,	 in	 the	
common	law,	challenges	against	the	state	are	heard	in	the	last	resort	by	judges	with	the	same	
training,	 professional	 experience,	 and	 institutional	 safeguards	 as	 all	 other	 members	 of	 the	
judiciary.	These	judges	hear	a	variety	of	cases	and	enjoy	all	the	traditional	guarantees	of	judicial	
independence,	namely	life	tenure	and	removal	from	office	only	for	serious	disciplinary	reasons.	
By	 contrast,	 in	 the	droit	 administratif,	 administrative	 litigation	 is	 brought	 before	 the	 Conseil	
d’Etat,	which	 is	composed	of	high-status	executive	branch	officials	who	not	only	decide	cases	
(adjudicatory	 function)	 but	 also	 give	 advice	 on	 proposed	 legislation	 and	 administrative	 rules	
(regulatory	 function)	 and	 who	 regularly	 rotate	 through	 important	 departments	 within	 the	
government	(Fromont,	2006:	121–22).3	Unlike	the	judiciary,	the	members	of	the	Conseil	d’Etat	
do	 not	 enjoy	 a	 formal	 guarantee	 of	 permanence	 in	 office	 (inamovibilité),	 meaning	 that	 it	 is	
theoretically	possible	(but	practically	unthinkable)	that	they	can	be	transferred	from	one	post	to	
another	 for	any	reason	and	not	only	 in	 the	case	of	misconduct.	Training	 is	different	 from	the	
personnel	selection	system	for	the	judiciary.	Recruits	attend	the	same	high-status	institutions	of	
higher	 learning	(grandes	écoles)	as	other	administrative	and	political	elites,	which	are	entirely	
																																								 																				
3	Since	1953,	there	has	also	existed	a	full-fledged	system	of	lower	administrative	courts	that	are	charged	with	hearing	
administrative	litigation	in	the	first	instance	and	on	appeal,	and	that	operate	somewhat	differently	from	the	Conseil	
d’Etat	(Morand-Deviller,	2013:	48–53).		
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separate	from	the	university	system	and	the	specialization	school	for	judges.	They	are	selected	
for	 the	 Conseil	 d’Etat	 based	 on	 the	 final	 exam	 administered	 by	 the	 École	 Nationale	
d’Administration,	 the	 last,	 sequentially,	 of	 these	high-status	 educational	 institutions.	 In	 other	
words,	by	virtue	of	their	educational	background	and	their	career	paths,	the	state	officials	that	
adjudicate	administrative	disputes	in	France	identify	less	with	the	career	judiciary	and	more	with	
the	upper	echelons	of	the	state	administration.		
On	 the	 doctrinal	 front,	 the	 French	 model	 is	 distinctive	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
administrative	 law,	both	substantive	and	procedural,	has	been	explicitly	and	comprehensively	
informed	by	the	specific	characteristics	of	the	public	sphere	and	the	special	prerogatives,	duties,	
and	rights	that	apply	in	the	face	of	state	action.	One	crucial	example	of	this	doctrinal	apparatus	
is	the	concept	of	service	public	(Allison,	1996:	66–69;	Brown	and	Bell,	1998:	129–34,	204,	230;	
Morand-Deviller,	2013:	455–98).		Service	public	(public	service)	serves	as	a	doctrinal	device	for	
allocating	 cases	 between	 the	 ordinary	 and	 the	 administrative	 court	 systems.	 	 In	 addition,	
administrative	 action	 involving	 a	 public	 service	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 special	 set	 of	 defenses	 and	
liabilities.	 	 The	 state	 is	 authorized	 to	 take	 whatever	 measures	 are	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 the	
continuity	of	the	public	service	and	to	adapt	the	service	to	changing	circumstances,	rendering	
lawful	administrative	action	which	might	otherwise	be	considered	 illegal	or	ultra	vires.	At	 the	
same	time,	the	administration	is	required	to	treat	all	users	of	the	service	equally	and	neutrally.	
In	the	realm	of	government	contracts,	the	administration	is	under	a	duty	to	compensate	private	
parties	for	losses	caused	by	any	unilateral	modification	of	contracts	in	the	interest	of	the	public	
service.	In	the	common	law	tradition,	the	same	outcomes	might	very	well	obtain	in	specific	cases.	
However,	 the	 notions	 of	 policy	 discretion,	 expertise,	 the	 public	 interest,	 arbitrariness,	 and	
fairness	that	justify	those	outcomes	have	been	developed	separately,	in	different	lines	of	cases	
involving	 different	 types	 of	 administrative	 litigation,	 and	 have	 not	 evolved	 under	 the	 single	
conceptual	umbrella	of	service	public.	
Moving	to	the	procedural	principles	that	inform	litigation	in	the	French	tradition,	they	too	
reflect	 the	 distinctiveness	 of	 public	 law	 (Fromont,	 2006:	 164–68).	 To	 obtain	 access	 to	
administrative	courts,	individuals	are	not	required	to	allege	a	particularized	harm	since	litigation	
against	 the	 state	 is	 conceived	as	vindicating	an	“objective”	 interest	 in	a	 republican	system	of	
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government	faithful	to	the	rule	of	law	rather	than	“subjective”	rights	in	property	and	liberty.	In	
contrast	 to	 these	quite	generous	 rules	on	 standing,	 remedies	have	 traditionally	been	 limited,	
based	on	the	same	theory	of	litigation	as	a	means	of	achieving	the	proper	operation	of	the	state	
rather	than	 individual	 justice.	 In	the	past,	 the	Conseil	d’Etat	could	either	annul	administrative	
acts	or	could	award	damages	in	tort	litigation	but	did	not	have	the	tools	to	afford	injunctive	relief	
to	 individuals	or	 to	 force	recalcitrant	administrative	authorities	 to	comply	with	 its	 judgments.	
Over	the	past	decades,	the	administrative	courts	have	obtained	a	much	wider	array	of	remedial	
powers	 to	 address	 the	 gaps	 and	 injustices	 caused	by	 this	 situation.	Overall,	 however,	 French	
procedure	stands	in	contrast	with	common	law	procedure,	where	individual	standing	and	legal	
remedies	are	patterned	on	the	principles	of	individual	harm	and	redress	characteristic	of	private	
law	litigation.	
Like	 the	 doctrinal	 and	 organizational	 composition	 of	 the	 two	 systems,	 the	 normative	
assessment	 of	 their	 relative	 merits	 has	 experienced	 a	 number	 of	 twists	 and	 turns	 over	 the	
decades.	Dicey	was	emphatic	that	the	common	law	stood	on	the	side	of	 liberty	and	the	droit	
administratif	 on	 the	 side	 of	 authority.	 This	 position	 was	 fairly	 representative	 of	 nineteenth-
century	politicians	and	scholars.	For	many	continental	 reformers,	 the	difference	between	 the	
common	law	and	droit	administratif	represented	a	choice	between	liberalism	and	absolutism.	In	
the	first	part	of	the	nineteenth	century,	most	 liberal	thinkers	 in	the	German	states	advocated	
that	legal	control	over	administration	be	vested	in	the	ordinary	courts	responsible	for	civil	and	
criminal	 litigation	 (Stolleis,	 2001:	 215–18;	 Ledford,	 2004:	 208–11).	 	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 ultimately	
unsuccessful	Constitution	of	the	German	Empire	of	1849,	the	older	system	of	purely	internal	and	
hierarchical	 review	 of	 administrative	 decisionmaking	 was	 rejected	 in	 favor	 of	 jurisdiction	
exercised	by	the	courts:	“Justice	under	the	auspices	of	the	administration	shall	cease;	courts	are	
to	decide	in	all	matters	of	violations	of	the	law.”	(Article	182)	In	1865,	liberal	currents	influential	
at	the	founding	of	the	unified	Italian	state	succeeded	in	removing	responsibility	for	administrative	
adjudication	 from	 the	 Italian	 Council	 of	 State	 and	 vesting	 the	 power	 to	 decide	 individual	
complaints	in	the	ordinary	courts	(Mattarella,	2010:	1016).4	In	the	common	law	world,	Dicey’s	
																																								 																				
4	In	1890,	however,	 judicial	powers	were	transferred	back	to	the	Council	of	State	at	 least	 in	part	because	of	 the	
ineffectiveness	of	the	ordinary	courts	in	curbing	the	growing	powers	of	state	administration	(Mattarella,	2010).	
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assessment	 remained	 influential	 well	 into	 the	 twentieth	 century	 (Allison,	 1996:	 23–27).	 For	
example,	the	American	legal	scholar	Bernard	Schwartz	wrote	in	1949:		
	
The	absence	of	public-law	concepts,	in	the	Continental	sense,	rather	than	being	a	
defect	 of	 our	 jurisprudence	 is,	 thus,	 its	 great	 strength.	 It	 enables	 control	 over	
Executive	action	to	be	maintained	through	the	same	institutions	that	administer	
the	normal	law	of	the	land,	and	on	the	same	basic	principles	of	justice.	It	prevents	
the	State	from	placing	its	own	officials	in	a	privileged	position	by	refusing	to	accept	
the	assertion	that	different	rules	are	applicable	to	their	action.	(151–52)	
	
Even	at	 the	 time	 that	Dicey	 first	pronounced	 the	great	divide,	however,	 there	were	a	
number	of	thinkers	who	questioned	his	assessment	of	the	two	systems.		As	early	as	1893,	the	
American	scholar	Frank	Goodnow	noted	in	his	comparative	study	on	administrative	law	in	France,	
Germany,	and	the	United	States,	“the	great	regard	which	the	[French]	administrative	courts	have	
for	private	rights”	(231).	The	American	political	scientist	James	Garner	prefaced	his	exposition	of	
the	 French	 system	 in	 the	 Yale	 Law	 Journal	 by	 noting	 the	 “extremely	 liberal	 and	 progressive	
character”	(1924:	597)	of	French	administrative	law	and	speculated	that	“[i]f	an	American	may	
venture	 to	 criticize	 its	 [Conseil	 d’Etat’s]	 jurisprudence	 he	 would	 say	 that	 it	 has	 been	 too	
progressive”	(1924:	627).	In	his	treatise	Justice	and	Administrative	Law	(1928),	the	English	public	
law	scholar	William	Robson	wrote	enthusiastically	of	the	French	system,	praised	the	emerging	
system	 of	 English	 administrative	 tribunals	 for	 their	 expertise	 and	 flexibility,	 and	 advocated	
entrusting	most	appeals	 to	 specialized	administrative	 courts	 that	were	quite	obviously	 in	 the	
mold	of	the	droit	administratif.		
The	debate	on	which	of	the	two	models	 is	superior	continues	today.	Some	have	come	
down	on	the	side	of	the	common	law	based	on	the	absence	of	a	jurisdictional	divide	between	
administrative	 and	 ordinary	 courts,	 thus	 avoiding	 expensive	 and	 lengthy	 litigation	 on	 the	
appropriate	forum	for	hearing	claims	against	state	actors	(see	generally	Brown	and	Bell,	1998:	
297–99).	 Harking	 back	 to	 the	 nineteenth-century	 liberty–authority	 dichotomy,	 the	 European	
Court	 of	Human	Rights	 has	 recently	 questioned	whether	 the	 institution	of	 a	 Council	 of	 State	
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satisfies	the	requirement	of	independence	that	is	part	of	the	right	to	a	fair	trial	(Article	6	of	the	
European	Convention	on	Human	Rights).	In	this	regard,	the	Court	has	criticized	the	practice	of	
mixing	regulatory	and	adjudicatory	functions	in	the	Council	of	State.5	It	has	also	sought	to	reduce	
the	institutional	presence	of	the	Commissaire	du	gouvernement,	a	member	of	the	Council	of	State	
who	 does	 not	 actually	 sit	 in	 judgment	 but	 is	 tasked	with	 advising	 the	 judges	 on	 the	 correct	
outcome	of	the	case	and	whose	role	is	conceived	as	informing	the	judges	on	the	objective	state	
of	the	law	(Bell,	2010).		
Others,	by	contrast,	have	highlighted	the	virtues	of	the	French	model.	In	the	1960s	and	
1970s,	the	Scottish	scholar	J.D.	Mitchell	lamented	the	absence	in	the	common	law	of	a	coherent	
system	of	public	law	similar	to	what	had	developed	in	France	and	went	so	far	as	to	state	that	the	
great	“tragedy”	of	the	common	law	was	that	there	was	no	general	concept	of	“administrative	
morality”	 (1965:	 113).	 His	 criticism	 was	 based	 on	 a	 number	 of	 absurdities	 that	 had	 been	
generated	in	the	piecemeal	and	evolutionary	process	of	seeking	to	extend	the	common	law	to	
the	administrative	state.	In	the	United	States,	the	legal	scholar	and	now	Supreme	Court	Justice	
Stephen	Breyer	has	suggested	that	a	central	executive	body	similar	to	the	Conseil	d’Etat	might	
be	 the	 answer	 to	 improving	 the	 quality	 of	 federal	 regulation	 (1995:	 70–72).	 In	Breaking	 the	
Vicious	Circle,	Breyer	wrote	an	early	account	of	the	failure	of	federal	regulation	to	adequately	
prioritize	in	policy	areas	such	as	public	health	and	consumer	well-being	and	to	develop	coherent	
and	cost-effective	strategies	to	tackle	risk.	His	proposed	solution,	a	centralized	group	of	career	
bureaucrats	 with	 the	 power	 to	 oversee	 the	 regulatory	 initiatives	 of	 federal	 agencies,	
incorporated	 many	 of	 the	 key	 attributes	 of	 the	 Conseil	 d’Etat.	 Like	 the	 Conseil	 d’Etat,	 the	
executive	body	would	have	the	power	to	review	and	annul	draft	regulations,	would	be	staffed	by	
officials	recruited	through	a	rigorous	selection	system	with	technical	expertise	in	specific	areas	
of	regulation,	and	would	be	built	on	a	career	model	in	which	officials	regularly	rotated	in	and	out	
of	regulatory	agencies.	These	institutional	features	would	all	guarantee	the	prestige	and	technical	
competence	of	the	regulatory	oversight	body.		Although	Breyer	mostly	drew	inspiration	from	the	
regulatory	 function	of	 the	Conseil	d’Etat,	he	also	 suggested	 that	his	proposed	oversight	body	
																																								 																				
5	Procola	v.	Luxembourg,	326	Eur.	Ct.	H.R.	(ser.	A)	(1995).	
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would	be	well	suited	to	adjudicate	 legal	disputes	over	regulation	and	that	 it	might	eventually	
supplant	or	even	entirely	replace	the	jurisdiction	of	the	federal	courts	(Breyer,	1995:	72).	
This	 is	not	 the	place	 to	weigh	 in	on	a	classic	debate	 in	 the	comparative	 law	 literature	
which,	 as	 demonstrated	 above,	 has	 a	 long	 history	 and	 shows	 no	 sign	 of	 abating.	 	 It	 is	 clear,	
however,	that	the	two	models	have	 important	consequences	for	cultures	of	 judicial	review	in	
France,	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 and	 the	 many	 jurisdictions	 across	 the	 world	 that	 have	 been	
influenced	by	 the	 two	 legal	 traditions.	They	also	have	 ramifications	 specifically	 for	 regulatory	
governance.	One	of	 the	most	 significant	 transformations	of	 the	 administrative	 state	 that	 has	
occurred	with	 the	 rise	 of	 regulatory	 governance	 is	 the	 shift	 from	direct	 state	 intervention	 in	
important	sectors	of	the	economy	to	the	reliance	on	rules	to	govern	a	competitive	private	market	
and	to	achieve	some	of	 the	same	policy	outcomes	as	direct	management.	These	rules,	unlike	
most	of	the	instruments	used	in	state	ownership	and	industrial	policy,	are	formal	and	are	subject	
to	legal	challenges	from	the	market	and	civil	society	actors	governed	by	the	rules.	Such	challenges	
can	be	expected	to	operate	somewhat	differently	in	the	common	law	and	the	droit	administratif	
traditions.	 One	 difference	 relates	 to	 access	 to	 justice.	 The	 procedural	 rules	 of	 the	 French	
tradition,	aimed	at	safeguarding	the	rule	of	law	and	the	republican	form	of	government,	should	
make	it	relatively	easy	and	quick	to	obtain	judicial	review	of	administrative	rules.	By	contrast,	in	
the	common	law	model,	the	necessity	of	satisfying	standing	requirements	analogous	to	those	
applicable	 in	 private	 litigation	 should	 make	 judicial	 review	 less	 widely	 available	 and	 less	
immediate.		
In	addition,	the	organizational	attributes	of	the	two	systems	of	adjudication	are	likely	to	
influence	how	rules	are	scrutinized.		As	will	be	recalled,	the	regulatory	and	adjudicatory	functions	
are	 institutionally	 mixed	 in	 the	 French	 system.	 	 The	 members	 of	 the	 Conseil	 d’Etat	 have	
significant,	direct	experience	in	the	upper	echelons	of	the	administration.	When	they	serve	on	
the	Conseil	d’Etat,	 they	are	called	upon,	at	different	points	 in	 their	 career,	both	 to	advise	on	
proposed	laws	and	regulations,	and	to	decide	on	challenges	to	regulations	after	they	come	into	
effect.	Although	different	sections	are	responsible	for	the	regulatory	and	adjudicatory	functions,	
the	voluminous	file	generated	when	the	rule	is	proposed	is	generally	also	consulted	if	that	same	
rule	is	subsequently	challenged	(Latour,	2010).	This	combination	of	functions	does	not	mean,	as	
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Dicey	 would	 have	 it,	 that	 the	 Conseil	 d’Etat	 is	 necessarily	 more	 deferential	 towards	 state	
authority;	indeed	it	might	very	well	be	less	deferential	because	it	has	professional	knowledge	of	
regulation	 and	 administrative	 agencies.	 It	 does	 suggest,	 however,	 that	 arguments	 on	 the	
technical	and	legal	substance	that	are	not	squarely	raised	at	the	time	of	the	rulemaking,	both	
within	the	government	and	 in	the	context	of	regulatory	review	by	the	Conseil	d’Etat,	are	 less	
likely	to	be	taken	seriously	on	judicial	review.	By	contrast,	in	the	common	law	tradition,	where	
the	judges	that	decide	administrative	cases	are	generally	outsiders	to	the	rulemaking	process,	
arguments	that	were	peripheral	in	the	rulemaking	process	may	find	greater	acceptance	at	the	
time	of	judicial	review.		
	
ADVERSARIAL	VERSUS	DISCRETIONARY	POLICYMAKING	
	
In	the	early	1990s,	scholarly	attention	turned	to	a	second	major	split	in	systems	of	judicial	review	
of	government	policymaking,	this	time	not	between	England	and	France	but	between	the	United	
States	and	Europe	(and	for	some	purposes,	Japan).		Reflecting	on	the	experience	in	the	1960s	
and	1970s	with	law	and	politics	in	advanced	democracies,	Robert	Kagan	developed	the	theory	of	
“adversarial	legalism”	(1991,	1994,	1997,	2001).		To	make	his	comparative	argument,	Kagan	drew	
on	 a	 number	 of	 cross-national	 studies	 in	 the	 law-and-society	 tradition	 that	 examined	 the	
operation	of	the	administrative	state	on	the	ground	in	Western	Europe,	Japan,	and	the	United	
States.	He	argued	that	policymaking	and	dispute	resolution	in	the	United	States	in	virtually	every	
area	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 life	was	more	 lawyer-driven	 and	 court-dominated	 than	 in	 other	
democracies,	which	 instead	relied	more	heavily	on	discretionary	policymaking	by	bureaucrats	
and	politicians	and	hierarchical	dispute	resolution	by	judges.6	His	theory	applies	across	the	board	
to	most	 areas	 of	 law	 but	 has	 special	 relevance	 for	 the	 law	 of	 the	 regulatory	 process.	 Kagan	
demonstrated	 that	 American	 legislation	 is	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 legal	 challenges,	 involving	
aggressive	 lawyering,	 novel	 theories	 of	 constitutional	 law,	 and	 activist	 courts.	 The	 American	
system	 also	 relies	 more	 heavily	 on	 litigants	 and	 courts	 for	 regulatory	 implementation	 and	
																																								 																				
6	The	difference	in	“regulatory	styles”	was	also	identified	by	David	Vogel	in	an	early	monograph	on	environmental	
policy	(1986).		
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enforcement	 than	 other	 jurisdictions,	 which	 give	 bureaucracies	 greater	 powers	 and	 have	
relatively	restrictive	rules	on	class	actions	and	other	procedural	devices	that	can	facilitate	litigant	
access	to	courts	(see	also	Hensler,	this	volume).	Rulemaking	in	American	bureaucracies	is	more	
proceduralized	and	lawyer-driven	than	in	most	other	countries	(see	also	Wagner,	this	volume;	
Smismans,	this	volume).	Enforcement	by	American	administrative	agencies	is	more	legalistic	and	
punitive.	 	And,	most	 relevant	 for	 this	chapter,	 the	 regulatory	policies	enacted	by	 the	political	
branches	and	implemented	by	bureaucracies	are	more	likely	to	be	challenged	in	the	courts	and	
defeated	 under	 theories	 of	 administrative	 and	 constitutional	 law	 than	 in	 other	 advanced	
democracies.			
Kagan’s	explanation	for	the	emergence	of	adversarial	legalism	rested	both	on	historically	
deep-rooted	structural	and	ideological	differences,	as	well	as	more	recent	events	associated	with	
the	post-material	turn	taken	in	most	western	democracies	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.	To	simplify	a	
highly	nuanced	account,	Kagan	argued	that	adversarial	 legalism	was	brought	on	by	a	burst	 in	
citizen	demand	for	public	interest	regulation	combined	with	a	long-standing	American	culture	of	
distrust	in	the	state	and	an	institutional	framework	of	small	and	divided	government.	In	contrast	
with	Europe,	the	ambitious	regulatory	programs	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	operated	in	a	context	of	
legal	 and	 institutional	 fragmentation.	 When	 the	 new	 programs	 were	 designed	 by	 Congress,	
implementation	was	not	delegated	exclusively	to	a	large	state	bureaucracy,	as	was	the	case	in	
many	other	democracies,	but	to	a	combination	of	federal	administrative	agencies,	state	and	local	
governments,	and	private	attorneys	general	with	 the	power	 to	enforce	 regulation	directly,	 in	
court.	To	compensate	for	the	policy	slippage	created	by	this	fragmented	arrangement,	Congress	
wrote	laws	that	were	highly	detailed	on	both	the	substance	and	the	procedure	and	that	would	
enable	private	litigants	to	sue	the	different	government	bodies	in	court	to	enforce	their	statutory	
mandates,	namely,	to	obtain	judicial	review.	Thus	the	legal	framework	for	adversarial	legalism	
was	put	into	place.	As	the	conceptual	label	indicates,	Kagan’s	normative	assessment	was	fairly	
negative.	He	suggested	that	the	more	informal,	consensual,	and	administratively	driven	system	
at	work	in	Europe	was	just	as	effective	or	more	so	at	delivering	policy	goods	and	guaranteeing	
social	welfare,	but	without	the	cost	and	uncertainty	generated	by	the	many	layers	of	lawyers,	
courts,	and	contestation	characteristic	of	the	American	system.		
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At	roughly	the	same	time	as	Kagan	wrote,	a	number	of	political	scientists	working	in	the	
rational-choice	 tradition	 came	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 administrative	 law	 component	 of	 adversarial	
legalism	(McCubbins	et	al.,	1987,	1989;	Epstein	and	O’Halloran,	1994,	1999;	Huber	and	Shipan,	
2002).	This	line	of	inquiry	elaborates	on	why	judicial	review	of	agency	policymaking	can	be	so	
demanding	in	the	American	system	and	has	been	influential	in	both	political	science	and	the	law.	
The	premise	of	this	rational-choice	scholarship	is	that	the	relationship	between	legislatures	and	
administration	 can	 be	 conceived	 as	 a	 principal–agent	 relationship	 in	 which	 the	 legislature	
(principal)	 has	 incentives	 to	 delegate	 the	 power	 of	 policy	 implementation	 to	 administration	
(agent)	but	administration,	in	turn,	has	incentives	to	defect	from	the	policy	preferences	of	the	
legislature.	 Legislators,	 therefore,	build	 into	 the	 law	a	number	of	devices	 to	control	wayward	
bureaucrats.	The	innovation	of	the	leading	proponents	of	this	approach,	Matthew	McCubbins,	
Roger	 Noll,	 and	 Barry	Weingast	 (McNollgast),	 was	 to	 conceptualize	 control	 tools	 broadly	 to	
include	 not	 only	 statutory	 commands	 and	 Congressional	 oversight	 but	 also	 administrative	
procedure	and	 judicial	 review.	McNollgast	 argued	 that,	notwithstanding	 the	outcome-neutral	
appearance	 of	 many	 administrative	 procedures,	 they	 were	 designed	 to	 entrench	 legislative	
bargains	and	to	ensure	that	the	interests	that	had	prevailed	in	the	legislative	process	would	do	
so	also	 in	 the	administrative	process.	 In	 their	 framework,	procedural	 requirements	 related	 to	
transparency,	participation,	and	reason-giving	within	the	bureaucracy,	and	the	right	to	enforce	
such	 requirements	 through	 judicial	 review,	 allowed	 the	 interest	 groups	 behind	 the	 enacting	
coalition	 to	monitor	 and	 influence,	 either	 directly	 or	 through	 their	 legislators,	 administrative	
outcomes.	McNollgast	 captured	 a	wide	 array	 of	 procedural	 requirements,	 backed	 by	 judicial	
review,	some	of	which	were	relatively	new,	for	instance	specific	reporting	requirements	written	
into	environmental	legislation,	and	some	of	which	were	more	general	and	of	older	vintage,	such	
as	 the	 rulemaking	provisions	of	 the	Administrative	Procedure	Act.	 The	vast	majority	of	 these	
requirements,	conceived	in	rational-choice	theory	as	principal–agent	control	instruments,	were	
also	among	those	blamed	by	Kagan	for	adversarial	legalism.				
Most	of	the	rational-choice	scholarship	on	regulatory	design	is	focused	specifically	on	the	
United	States	and	the	relationship	between	federal	administrative	agencies	and	Congress.	A	few	
scholars,	however,	have	engaged	 in	comparative	analysis	 to	highlight	and	explain	the	relative	
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absence	elsewhere	of	formal	procedural	safeguards	in	the	regulatory	process,	together	with	a	
reduced	 role	 for	courts	and	 judicial	 review	 (Moe	and	Caldwell,	1994;	Epstein	and	O’Halloran,	
1999:	242–44;	Thies,	2001;	Strøm	2003;	Jensen	and	McGrath,	2011;	Rose-Ackerman	et	al.,	2015;	
Rose-Ackerman	et	al.,	this	volume).	They	focus	on	the	different	strategic	incentives	that	exist	in	
the	 institutional	 context	 of	 American	 presidentialism—an	 important	 aspect	 of	 fragmented	
American	government—and	parliamentarism,	the	form	of	government	prevalent	in	Europe	and	
much	of	 the	 rest	of	 the	world.	 In	 line	with	principal–agent	 theory,	procedural	 constraints	on	
administrative	action	are	 conceptualized	as	a	device	 for	 locking	 in	political	deals	when	policy	
implementation	is	delegated	to	administrative	actors.	Although	the	accounts	vary,	they	converge	
on	 a	 couple	 of	 characteristics	 of	 parliamentary	 government	 that	make	 procedural	 rights	 and	
judicial	 review	 a	 less	 likely	 strategy	 of	 political	 control	 for	 legislatures.	 First,	when	 the	 same	
majority	 party	 or	 coalition	 of	 parties	 controls	 both	 the	 legislature	 and	 the	 government,	 the	
likelihood	of	defection	is	lower:	administrative	agencies	have	fewer	opportunities	and	face	less	
pressure	to	defect	from	the	legislative	bargain	since	they	report	only	to	one	political	principal	
and	 not	 to	 the	 multiple	 principals	 of	 Congress	 and	 the	 President	 (especially	 problematic	 in	
periods	of	divided	government).	Secondly,	formalization	is	a	costly	mechanism	for	entrenching	
political	 deals	 because	 it	 reduces	 administrative	 flexibility,	 imposes	 cumbersome	 and	 time-
consuming	procedures,	and	introduces	third-party	monitors	in	the	form	of	interest	groups	and	
the	 courts	 which	 themselves	 may	 be	 a	 source	 of	 principal–agent	 slack.	 Thirdly,	 there	 exist	
alternative,	 less	 costly	 forms	 of	 control	 in	 parliamentary	 systems,	 such	 as	 the	 political	
appointment	of	ministers	and	junior	ministers	who	can	monitor	the	work	of	bureaucracies	and	
can,	in	the	case	of	a	multiparty	coalition,	ensure	that	the	coalition	agreement	rather	than	any	
one	party	in	the	coalition	prevails	in	the	administrative	policymaking	process.	Fourthly,	because	
of	 the	 concentration	 of	 legislative	 power	 in	 the	 governing	 coalition	 or	 majority	 party,	
administrative	procedure	operates	as	a	relatively	ineffective	and	therefore	unlikely	instrument	
of	 control	 in	 parliamentary	 systems:	 even	 if	 a	 particular	 legislature	 did	 enact	 administrative	
procedure,	a	subsequent	legislature	would	be	likely	to	quickly	undo	it,	incentivized	by	the	limited	
benefits	and	extensive	costs	of	procedure	described	above.	
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Among	those	who	have	considered	the	ramifications	of	this	 institutional	difference	for	
comparative	public	law,	the	work	of	Susan	Rose-Ackerman	is	among	the	most	significant.	In	an	
earlier	study	on	German	and	American	environmental	policy	(1995:	125–33)	and	recent	research	
on	 policymaking	 procedure	 in	 a	 number	 of	 legal	 systems	 (Rose-Ackerman	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Rose-
Ackerman	et	al.,	this	volume),	she	has	argued	in	favor	of	American	rulemaking	procedure	and	
judicial	review.	The	normative	argument	closely	dovetails	the	positive,	rational-choice	analysis:	
in	her	theoretical	account,	transparency,	participation,	and	reason-giving	in	the	administrative	
process,	backed	by	judicial	review,	enable	both	legislators	and	citizens	to	oversee	administrative	
agencies	and	therefore	render	executive	policymaking	democratically	accountable.	At	the	same	
time,	Rose-Ackerman	argues	that	procedure	and	judicial	oversight	ensure	that	bureaucrats	will	
make	decisions	in	a	technically	competent	fashion	that	comports	with	means–ends	rationality.	
Returning	full	circle	to	the	more	general	differences	traced	by	Robert	Kagan	between	American	
adversarial	 legalism	 and	 the	 European	 administrative	 state,	 it	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 Rose-
Ackerman	departs	significantly	from	his	assessment	of	the	two	systems.	In	her	analysis,	the	costs	
associated	with	 procedure	 and	 judicial	 review	are	 outweighed	by	 the	 benefits	 to	 democratic	
accountability	and	policymaking	competence.	
	To	summarize,	adversarial	legalism	and	the	institutional	structure	of	presidentialism	have	
significant	 implications	 for	 the	 judicial	 review	component	of	 government	policymaking	 in	 the	
United	 States.	 As	 compared	 with	 other	 established	 democracies,	 policymaking	 within	
administrative	agencies	is	more	formal,	proceduralized,	and	adversarial.		American	bureaucrats	
are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 sued	 in	 court,	 both	 for	 having	 breached	 the	 onerous	 procedural	
requirements	 and	 for	 having	 failed	 to	 satisfy	 the	 substantive	 standards	 of	 administrative	
rationality.	 The	 difference	 applies	 precisely	 to	 the	 activities	 specifically	 associated	 with	 the	
regulatory	function—designing	generally	applicable	rules	that	regulate	liberalized	markets.	Other	
administrative	 activities	 such	 as	 the	mass	 adjudication	 of	 individual	 claims	 in	 the	 context	 of	
welfare	programs	tend	to	be	proceduralized	and	amenable	to	judicial	review	everywhere,	driven	
by	 the	 liberal	 commitment	 to	 fair	procedure	 in	 individualized	determinations.	With	 the	 rising	
prominence	of	 regulation,	making	 it	an	 important	 form	of	governance	not	only	 in	 the	United	
States	but	also	in	the	European	Union	and	other	parts	of	the	world,	some	have	suggested	that	
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rulemaking	 too	will	 become	 adversarial	 everywhere	 (Kelemen,	 2011;	 Kelemen,	 this	 volume).	
Whether	this	is	indeed	the	case	is	an	open	question	that	will	continue	to	be	the	subject	of	debate	
for	some	time	to	come	(Bignami	and	Kelemen,	forthcoming).		
	
RIGHTS	VERSUS	DEMOCRACY	
	
In	recent	years,	a	third	divide	between	systems	of	judicial	review	of	government	policymaking	
has	become	increasingly	apparent.	This	is	the	contrast	between	judicial	review	based	on	theories	
of	fundamental	economic	and	social	rights,	which	is	prevalent	in	European	legal	systems	and,	a	
growing	body	of	evidence	suggests,	jurisdictions	in	other	parts	of	the	globe;	and	judicial	review	
conceived	as	a	handmaiden	of	the	democratic	process,	which	dominates	in	the	United	States.	As	
I	 have	 begun	 to	 elaborate	 elsewhere,	 outside	 of	 policing	 administrative	 actors	 for	 fidelity	 to	
statutory	mandates,	American	and	European	courts	take	fundamentally	different	approaches	to	
the	 judicial	 review	 of	 public	 policymaking	 (Bignami,	 2011:	 898–902;	 2012:	 148–60).	 While	
European	 courts	 safeguard	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 liberties	 from	 the	 burdensome	 action	 of	
policymakers,	 American	 courts	 seek	 to	 advance	 a	 particular	 vision	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	
administrative	 process.	 In	 the	 rest	 of	 this	 section,	 I	 elaborate	 on	 the	 two	 theories	 of	 judicial	
review,	suggest	an	explanation	for	the	different	jurisprudential	trajectories,	and	explore	some	of	
the	possible	implications	of	the	difference.		
To	 begin	 with	 Europe,	 the	 most	 prominent	 example	 of	 judicial	 review	 driven	 by	
fundamental	 rights	 is	 the	 principle	 of	 proportionality.	 It	 is	 associated	with	 the	 same	political	
philosophy	 of	 liberalism	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 historical	 development	 of	
administrative	 litigation.	 Proportionality’s	 origins	 are	 generally	 traced	 to	 nineteenth-century	
Prussia	and	the	gradual	shift	from	absolutism	to	the	rule	of	law	or,	in	the	language	of	the	time,	
the	shift	from	“der	Polizeistaat”	to	the	“Rechtstaat”	(Barak,	2012:	175).	In	Germany,	as	in	much	
of	the	rest	of	continental	Europe,	one	of	the	defining	elements	of	liberalism	and	the	rule	of	law	
was	the	recognition	of	a	private	sphere	of	liberty	and	property	independent	of	the	state	(Stolleis,	
2001).		To	safeguard	that	private	sphere,	it	was	critical	that	all	government	interferences	with	
property	and	 liberty	be	authorized	by	 law	and	 that	 individuals	be	able	 to	go	 to	court	 if	 state	
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officials	exceeded	 the	boundaries	of	 that	 law.	The	 rule	of	 law,	however,	was	also	 tied	 to	 the	
identification	of	a	set	of	rights	guaranteed	by	natural	law	and	judicial	control	designed	to	protect	
those	rights.	This	was	especially	apparent	in	the	shifting	terrain	of	the	police	power.	Although	
local	authorities	still	operated	under	vague	statutory	provisions	directing	them	to	protect	public	
health	and	security,	a	fairly	elaborate	conceptual	apparatus	was	developed	in	the	law	to	limit	
their	 powers	 and	 their	 intrusion	 upon	 liberty	 and	 property,	 including	 the	 principle	 of	
proportionality.	
Proportionality	was	used	 in	Prussian	courts	and	 legal	scholarship	to	curtail	 the	type	of	
action,	 if	 any,	 that	 could	 be	 used	 by	 local	 authorities	 to	 protect	 public	 health	 and	 security.		
Today’s	 legal	 scholarship	 generally	 defines	 proportionality	 as	 comprised	 of	 	 three	 elements:	
whether	the	government	action	is	capable	of	achieving	the	stated	end	(suitability);	whether	the	
government	action	is	necessary	to	achieve	the	stated	end	(necessity);	and	whether	on	balance	
the	benefits	from	the	government	action	outweigh	the	burdens	on	individual	rights	(balancing	or	
proportionality	stricto	sensu)	(Grimm,	2007).The	first	two	elements	in	particular	(suitability	and	
necessity)	were	apparent	in	Prussian	law.	As	the	leading	administrative	law	scholar	of	the	time,	
Otto	Mayer,	explained:	
	
The	basis	of	the	police	power	in	natural	law	requires	that	the	[protection	of	the	
good	order	of	the	public	thing]	be	in	proportion	to	the	disturbance;	this	defines	
the	extent	of	 the	action	of	 the	police.	 It	 should	not	be	presumed	that	 the	 law,	
through	 general	 authorizations	 by	 virtue	 of	 which	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 police	
operates,	wished	to	permit	such	protection	to	exceed	this	natural	limit.	(1904:	29)	
	
Thus,	 for	 instance,	 in	a	case	decided	 in	1880,	the	Prussian	Supreme	Administrative	Law	Court	
found	 against	 the	 police	 because	 they	 had	 banned	 all	 women	 likely	 to	 be	 prostitutes	 from	
entering	the	home	of	a	suspected	pimp	rather	than	resorting	to	the	less	intrusive	surveillance	
measures	available	to	them	(1904:	32).	Although	the	third	element	of	proportionality	(balancing)	
is	harder	to	discern,	there	is	evidence	of	the	concept	in	the	legal	scholarship	of	the	time.	Again	
referring	to	Otto	Mayer,	he	argued	that	when	public	authorities	exercised	the	police	power	they	
Bignami—Regulation	and	the	Courts	
	
20	
	
were	bound	to	demonstrate	that	the	beneficial	effects	of	public	action	outweighed	the	burden	
on	private	life	(1904:	20–21n.	2).		At	issue	in	the	particular	case	under	consideration	was	a	Berlin	
ordinance	forbidding	the	use	of	stove-pipe	keys	in	homes,	which	according	to	Mayer	constituted	
an	especially	burdensome	interference	with	the	protected	sphere	of	“private	life.”		
After	World	War	 II	and	 the	adoption	of	 the	German	Basic	Law,	proportionality	 rapidly	
became	an	overarching	principle	of	both	administrative	law	and	constitutional	law.	In	the	1950s,	
the	 concept	was	 elaborated	 by	 administrative	 law	 scholars	 to	 include	 the	 three	 elements	 of	
suitability,	necessity,	and	balancing,	and	came	to	be	applied	to	all	forms	of	administrative	action	
(von	Krauss,	1955;	Lerche,	1961).	Soon	thereafter,	the	concept	migrated	to	constitutional	 law	
with	the	judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	in	the	Pharmacy	Case.7	This	famous	case	
involved	 a	 challenge	 to	 a	 Bavarian	 statute	 that	 set	 down	 criteria	 for	 granting	 permits	 to	
pharmacies,	including	economic	viability	and	the	potential	harm	to	competitors.	A	pharmacy	that	
was	denied	a	permit	sued	based	on	the	constitutionally	guaranteed	right	to	choose	and	exercise	
a	profession.	The	Court,	 in	holding	for	 the	pharmacy,	assessed	the	 liberty	claim	based	on	the	
proportionality	principle	and	in	doing	so	provided	the	first	clear	endorsement	of	the	principle	in	
constitutional	 law.	 In	 the	 judgments	 that	 immediately	 followed,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	
proportionality	would	apply	in	any	case	involving	rights	and	liberties.	Since	then,	it	has	become	
a	cornerstone	of	constitutional	law	and	has	become	one	of	the	leading	German	legal	exports	to	
the	rest	of	the	world	(Barak,	2012:	182).			
Given	how	prominent	proportionality	has	become	in	constitutional	law,	it	is	easy	to	focus	
on	cases	involving	political	and	civil	rights	such	as	freedom	of	expression	and	race	discrimination	
and	to	lose	sight	of	how	the	principle	originated	in	the	classic	economic	rights	implicated	by	the	
administrative	state.	Today	 it	 is	still	used	 in	the	economic	domain.	 	A	couple	of	examples	will	
illustrate	the	point.	The	first	 is	the	German	case	that	 led	to	the	adoption	of	proportionality	 in	
European	Union	 (EU)	 law.	 In	 Internationale	Handelsgesellschaft,	 a	German	company	 failed	 to	
export	the	quantities	of	maize	stipulated	in	an	export	license	it	had	obtained	pursuant	to	an	EU	
																																								 																				
7 	Bundesverfassungsgericht	 [BVerfG]	 [Federal	 Constitutional	 Court]	 June	 11,	 1958,	 7		
Entscheidungen	des	Bundesverfassungsgerichts	[BVerfGE]	377.	
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Council	regulation	and,	as	a	result,	pursuant	to	the	terms	of	the	regulation,	it	forfeited	the	entire	
amount	of	 the	deposit	 it	had	provided	at	 the	time	 it	had	obtained	the	 license.8	The	company	
challenged	the	regulation	before	a	German	administrative	court	based	on	the	rights	of	freedom	
of	action	and	economic	freedom	guaranteed	under	Articles	2(1)	and	14	of	the	German	Basic	Law.	
The	German	court	referred	the	proportionality	question	to	the	Court	of	Justice,	which	recognized	
for	the	first	time	that	such	liberties,	along	with	the	related	proportionality	principle,	were	part	of	
EU	law.	The	Court	of	Justice	then	conducted	the	proportionality	inquiry:	it	found	that	forfeiture	
of	the	deposit	was	both	suitable	and	necessary	to	the	end	of	ensuring	that	the	Commission	was	
properly	 informed	 of	 the	 overall	 volume	 of	 exports	 and	 imports,	 essential	 to	 regulating	 the	
market	 in	 agricultural	 commodities.	 Turning	 to	 the	 balancing	 component	 of	 the	 test,	 namely	
whether	the	burden	on	the	individual	right	was	disproportionate	to	the	public	benefits	from	the	
policy,	the	Court	found	that	since	the	amount	of	the	deposit	was	minimal	and	there	was	a	force	
majeure	exception	to	the	forfeiture,	the	EU	regulation	satisfied	proportionality	stricto	sensu.	
Returning	to	the	German	Federal	Constitutional	Court,	it	has	routinely	acted	to	protect	
the	right	of	occupational	freedom	and	the	related	proportionality	principle	at	issue	in	the	historic	
Pharmacy	Case.	In	a	challenge	brought	by	a	candy	manufacturer	to	a	federal	regulation	banning	
the	sale	of	cocoa-like	products	because	of	the	risk	to	consumers	of	confusing	such	sweets	with	
real	 chocolate,	 the	 Court	 found	 that	 the	 necessity	 prong	 had	 been	 violated	 because	 of	 the	
availability	 of	 a	 less-restrictive	 measure—a	 labelling	 requirement—to	 prevent	 consumer	
confusion.9	In	another	case,	occupational	freedom	lost	out	to	animal	welfare.10	The	Court	found	
that	a	farming	regulation	prescribing	the	minimum	dimension	of	chicken	coops	was	too	favorable	
to	farmer	rights	and	did	not	adequately	guarantee	the	animal	welfare	interests	protected	under	
the	enabling	statute.		More	recently,	based	on	the	same	right	of	occupational	freedom,	the	Court	
struck	down	a	law	banning	smoking	in	public	restaurants	because	of	the	failure	of	the	statutory	
scheme	to	consistently	promote	the	purported	aim	of	protecting	against	smoke.11	
																																								 																				
8	Case	11/70,	Internationale	Handelsgesellschaft	v.	Einfuhr,	1970	E.C.R.	1125.	
9	BVerfG,	Jan.	16,	1980,	53	BVerfGE	135.	
10	BVerfG,	Apr.	13,	1999,	101	BVerfGE	1.	
11	BVerfG,	June	11,	2008,	121	BVerfGE	317.				
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As	has	already	been	suggested,	proportionality	is	not	confined	to	German	law,	but	has	
become	central	to	European	law,	in	both	national	jurisdictions	(Fromont,	2006:	255-61;	Barak,	
2012:	 186–87;	 Rose-Ackerman	 et	 al.,	 this	 volume)	 and	 the	 supranational	 European	 Union	
(Tridimas,	2006:	136–241)	and	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(Letsas,	2006:	711).	It	has	also	
spread	to	 legal	systems	outside	of	Europe,	 including	 Israel,	Canada,	South	Africa,	 India,	South	
Korea,	 and	 Taiwan	 (Barak,	 2012:	 188–204;	 Huang	 and	 Law,	 this	 volume).	 Important	 for	 the	
purposes	of	this	chapter,	it	protects	liberty	from	both	legislative	and	administrative	action,	and	
it	extends	to	all	types	of	rights,	although	with	different	levels	of	intensity,	including	civil,	political,	
and	economic	rights	and	even,	in	some	cases,	positive	social	and	economic	rights.			
Another	important	example	of	how	fundamental	rights	are	used	in	European	law	to	curb	
government	 policymaking	 is	 the	 principle	 of	 equality.	 	While	 German	 law	 is	 at	 the	 origin	 of	
proportionality,	the	genealogy	of	equality	is	often	traced	to	French	law.	In	the	jurisprudence	of	
the	 Conseil	 d’Etat	 on	 general	 principles	 of	 law	 (principes	 généraux	 du	 droit)―higher-law	
principles	 rooted	 in	 political	 theories	 of	 liberalism	 and	 republicanism	 and	 enforced	 against	
administration	and	the	political	executive—equality	is	one	of	the	oldest	and	most	fundamental	
(Long	et	al.,	2013:	418).	The	principle	of	equality	is	loosely	linked	to	the	Declaration	of	the	Rights	
of	Man	and	of	the	Citizen	of	1789,	and	was	first	recognized	by	the	Conseil	d’Etat	in	1913	in	the	
Roubeau	case.12	It	applies	to	both	policymaking	and	individual	decisionmaking	and	has	evolved	
into	a	series	of	specific	principles	applicable	to	certain	types	of	government	activity:		equality	in	
the	 operation	 of	 public	 services,13 	equality	 in	 taxation,14 	equality	 in	 bearing	 public	 burdens	
(charges	publiques),15	equal	access	to	the	civil	service,16	equality	between	members	of	the	civil	
service, 17 	sex	 equality, 18 	equality	 between	 nationals	 and	 non-nationals	 in	 the	 domain	 of	
fundamental	 rights, 19 	equality	 between	 users	 of	 public	 services	 or	 state-owned	 property	
																																								 																				
12	CE	May	9,	1913,	Rec.	Lebon	521.	
13	CE	Sect.,	Mar.	9,	1951,	Rec.	Lebon	151.		
14	CE	Sect.,	Feb.	4,	1944,	Rec.	Lebon	45.	
15	CE	Nov.	30,	1923,	Rec.	Lebon	789.	
16	CE	Ass.,	May	28,	1954,	Rec.	Lebon	308.	
17	CE	Sect.,	Oct.	26,	1979,	Rec.	Lebon	396.	
18	CE	Ass.,	July	3,	1936,	Rec.	Lebon	721.	
19	CE	Ass.,	Dec.	8,	1978,	Rec.	Lebon	493.	
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(domaine	public),20	and	equal	treatment	under	economic	regulation.21	The	principle	is	generally	
formulated	as	the	duty	to	treat	equal	situations	equally	and	different	situations	differently	and	
requires	that	any	difference	in	treatment	be	justified	in	light	of	the	objectives	of	the	enabling	law	
(Fromont,	2006:	254).		
A	couple	of	examples	will	illustrate	the	reach	of	the	equality	principle	and	how	deeply	it	
cuts	into	the	operation	of	the	administrative	state,	including	the	regulatory	function.	In	what	is	
generally	 recognized	 as	 the	 foundational	 case	 for	 equality	 in	 the	 area	 of	 public	 services,	 the	
Conseil	d’Etat	annulled	a	decision	of	Radiodiffusion	 français	 (a	public	broadcasting	service)	 in	
which	it	refused	to	broadcast	concerts	organized	by	the	Société	des	Concerts	du	Conservatoire.22	
The	Conseil	d’Etat	found	that	as	the	provider	of	a	public	service	the	broadcaster	was	bound	by	
the	equality	principle,	that	it	had	violated	that	principle	by	singling	out	Société	des	Concerts	du	
Conservatoire	 and	 refusing	 to	 broadcast	 its	 concerts,	 and	 that	 it	 was	 consequently	 liable	 in	
damages.	 In	 1985,	 a	 Paris	 police	 regulation	 restricting	 permits	 for	 sidewalk	 vendors	 to	 war	
victims,	persons	with	family,	and	needy	persons	was	found	to	impermissibly	discriminate	against	
other	types	of	applicants.	23	The	Conseil	found	that	the	“general	interest,	which	is	linked	to	the	
social	protection	of	persons	so	defined	was	not	sufficiently	important	to	entirely	exclude	all	other	
applicants.”	In	2011,	the	Conseil	annulled	a	provision	of	the	highway	code	delegating	the	task	of	
automobile	safety	inspections	to	auto	repair	shops	that	were	members	of	a	national	organization	
on	the	grounds	that	it	violated	the	principle	of	equality	as	between	affiliated	and	independent	
auto	repair	shops.24	Even	more	recently,	the	Conseil	annulled	a	social	security	decree	increasing	
pension	benefits	 for	mineworkers	which	only	applied	 to	workers	with	a	 lengthy	employment	
history	on	 the	grounds	 that	 the	ministry	had	 failed	 to	 justify	 the	difference	between	the	 two	
																																								 																				
20	CE	Sect.,	Nov.	2,	1956,	Rec.	Lebon	403.		
21	CE	Oct.	26,	1949,	Rec.	Lebon	433.	
22	CE	Sect.,	Mar.	9,	1951,	Rec.	Lebon	151.		
23	CE	Sect.,	Dec.	18,	1985,	Rec.	Lebon	380.	For	a	similar	set	of	facts	and	legal	arguments	in	a	case	decided	by	the	
South	Korean	Constitutional	Court,	see	Huang	and	Law	(this	volume).		
24Société	 Auto	 Bilan	 France,	 6/1	 SSR,	 342498,	 Oct.	 21,	 2011,	 reported	 in	 Jurisprudence	 des	
formations	contentieuses	du	Conseil	d’Etat,	Oct.	2011,	at	17.	
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classes	 of	mineworkers.25	Of	 course,	 there	 are	 numerous	 instances	 in	which	 the	 Conseil	 has	
rejected	 equality	 claims,	 indeed	 probably	more	 numerous	 than	 those	 in	which	 it	 has	 upheld	
them.	 For	 instance,	 in	 a	 case	dating	 to	1983,	 the	Conseil	 heard	a	 challenge	 to	a	 government	
decree	declaring	a	certain	territory	to	be	a	natural	reserve	and	regulating	the	use	of	the	reserve.26	
One	of	the	complaints	was	that	the	government	had	impermissibly	singled	out	certain	areas	of	
the	reserve	for	camping	and	bivouacing,	to	the	exclusion	of	the	rest,	but	the	Conseil	found	that	
difference	in	treatment	was	justified	by	the	objective	of	nature	protection.		
As	with	proportionality,	 the	equality	 principle	made	 its	way	early	 on	 to	 the	 European	
Court	of	Justice.		It	first	appeared	in	the	1950s	in	cases	challenging	civil	service	decisions	of	the	
EU	institutions27	as	well	as	High	Authority	decisions	involving	the	differential	treatment	of	coal	
and	 steel	 producers	 and	 users. 28 	Somewhat	 later,	 the	 principle	 emerged	 in	 challenges	 to	
regulatory	 decisions	 in	 the	 common	 agricultural	 policy	 area	 which	 discriminated	 between	
different	types	of	producers.29	It	is	also	common	to	the	administrative	law	of	the	member	states,	
in	particular	the	judicial	review	of	administrative	rules	(Fromont,	2006:	253,	293),	and	to	national	
constitutional	 law	 (Baer,	 2012;	 Kommers	 and	 Miller,	 2012:	 419–40),	 including	 French	
constitutional	law	since	the	expansion	of	the	Constitutional	Council’s	powers	in	the	1980s	(Stone,	
1992).	 Although	 there	 has	 been	 less	 attention	 to	 equality	 than	 to	 proportionality	 in	 the	
comparative	 literature,	 it	 appears	 to	 operate	 as	 a	 cross-cutting	 principle	 in	 a	 number	 of	
jurisdictions	 outside	 of	 Europe	 too	 (Huang	 and	 Law,	 this	 volume).	 In	 addition,	 similar	 to	
proportionality	and	important	for	understanding	judicial	review	in	the	context	of	the	regulatory	
state,	equality	is	a	principle	applicable	in	both	the	administrative	and	legislative	domains,	and	
generally	 protects	 against	 all	 forms	 of	 discrimination,	 including	 social	 and	 economic	
classifications.		
																																								 																				
25	Syndicat	national	CFDT	des	mineurs	et	assimilés	et	du	personnel	du	régime	minier	et	autres,	
1/6	 SSR,	 353703,	 353707,	 353781,	 Nov.	 27,	 2013,	 reported	 in	 Jurisprudence	 des	 formations	
contentieuses	du	Conseil	d’Etat,	Nov.	2013,	at	16.	
26	CE	Ass.,	May	19,	1983,	Rec.	Lebon	205.	
27	See,	e.g.,	Case	1/55,	Kergall	v.	Common	Assembly,	1955	E.C.R.	151,	169.	
28 	See,	 e.g.,	 Case	 8/57,	 Hauts	 Fourneaux	 et	 Aciéries	 Belges	 v.	 High	 Authority	 of	 the	 European	 Coal	 and	 Steel	
Community,	1958	E.C.R.	245.	
29	See,	e.g.,	Case	114/76,	Bela-Müle	Josef	Bergmann	KG	v.	Grows-Farm	GmbH,	1977	E.C.R.	1211.			
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There	are	a	number	of	other	doctrines	that	are	also	designed	to	protect	 liberty	 in	 the	
context	of	the	contemporary	administrative	state.	These	are	generally	concerned	with	positive	
rights	such	as	government	benefits	and	have	been	recognized	in	the	primary	law	of	constitutions	
and	 in	 the	 court-generated	 principles	 of	 non-retroactivity,	 legal	 certainty,	 and	 legitimate	
expectations	 (Kommers	 and	 Miller,	 2012:	 622–23;	 Bignami	 and	 Spivack,	 2014).	 While	 the	
constitutional	 law	generally	begins	 from	the	premise	 that	 individuals	are	entitled	 to	a	certain	
minimum	 level	 of	welfare	 from	 the	 state,	 the	 judge-made	 principles	 are	 designed	 to	 restrict	
changes	 to	 government	 programs	 once	 they	 have	 been	 put	 into	 place	 by	 legislative	 and	
administrative	actors.				
In	 the	American	system,	by	contrast,	 individual	 rights	 rarely	 form	the	basis	 for	 judicial	
review	 of	 the	 market-regulating	 and	 welfare-distributing	 functions	 of	 the	 contemporary	
administrative	 state.	 This	 is	 a	 product	 of	 the	 rigid	 hierarchy	 of	 fundamental	 rights	 which	 is	
distinctive	 to	 the	American	 system	and	which	has	been	amply	documented	 in	 scholarship	on	
comparative	 constitutional	 law	 (Mathews	 and	 Stone	 Sweet,	 2011;	 Barak,	 2012:	 509–27).	
Economic	rights	and	classifications	are	part	of	the	lowest	tier	of	the	hierarchy,	which	is	afforded	
only	minimal,	so-called	“rational	basis”	judicial	review;	most	commentators	agree	that,	once	a	
case	is	slotted	into	the	“rational	basis”	category,	the	outcome,	in	favor	of	the	state	and	against	
individual	rights,	is	a	foregone	conclusion	(Sunstein,	1985).	As	Aharon	Barak	explains,	in	contrast	
with	proportionality	and	equality,	which	are	applied	in	every	case	to	balance	between	the	injury	
to	 the	 fundamental	 right	 and	 the	 general	 interest	 that	motivates	 state	 action,	 the	 American	
approach	seeks	to	balance	in	advance,	through	the	constitutional	hierarchy	of	rights	(2012:	512).	
Rights	at	the	top	of	the	hierarchy,	such	as	the	right	to	speech,	require	a	very	good	justification	
from	the	state	before	the	interference	will	be	considered	permissible.	Rights	at	the	bottom	of	
the	hierarchy,	including	economic	rights,	require	virtually	no	justification	at	all	to	warrant	state	
interference.	 	 Therefore,	 cases	 involving	 rights	 such	 as	 the	 right	 to	 exercise	 a	 profession	 or	
conduct	 a	 trade,	which	have	 a	 chance	of	 success	 under	 the	principles	 of	 proportionality	 and	
equality,	automatically	fail	under	rational	basis	review.		
The	absence	of	fundamental	rights	from	judicial	review	of	the	American	administrative	
state	is	also	a	function	of	the	tendency	of	the	Supreme	Court,	in	contrast	with	other	constitutional	
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courts,	 to	 define	 the	 scope	 of	 rights	 narrowly	 and	 to	 refrain	 from	 creatively	 interpreting	
constitutional	text	to	recognize	new	rights	(Currie,	1989).	This	has	had	an	impact	especially	in	the	
domain	 of	 the	 welfare	 state:	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 not	 recognized	 any	 positive	 social	 and	
economic	 rights	under	 the	Constitution	 and	 there	 are	 few	 judge-made	 constraints	 on	drastic	
shifts	in	entitlement	programs,	either	at	the	legislative	or	the	administrative	levels	(Bignami	and	
Spivack,	2014).	In	other	words,	the	hardship	created	by	the	revocation	of	government	benefits	
and	other	types	of	advantageous	treatment	is	not	tempered,	as	in	certain	European	jurisdictions,	
by	positive	constitutional	rights	and	judicial	doctrines	such	as	legitimate	expectations	and	legal	
certainty.		
As	the	literature	on	adversarial	legalism	and	delegation	demonstrates,	American	courts	
do	intervene	in	government	policymaking.		They	do	so,	however,	based	on	theories	related	to	
the	preservation	of	the	democratic	process,	or	what	I	call	the	“ballot-box	democracy”	paradigm	
of	public	law.		In	reviewing	legislative	action,	American	courts	police	for	fidelity	to	federalism	and	
the	other	structural	guarantees	of	 the	Constitution;	 in	 reviewing	administrative	policymaking,	
courts	 engage	 in	 what	 one	 leading	 administrative	 law	 scholar	 has	 labelled	 “proceduralized	
rationality	review”	(Mashaw,	2012:	289).	In	the	interest	of	space,	this	section	will	focus	on	the	
latter	 form	 of	 review—judicial	 oversight	 of	 administrative	 actors	 when	 they	 engage	 in	
policymaking.		Proceduralized	rationality	review	encompasses	a	number	of	doctrinal	grounds	of	
review,	both	the	procedural	requirements	analyzed	in	the	previous	section	and	in	other	chapters	
in	 this	 volume	 (Wagner;	 Rose-Ackerman)	 and	 the	 substantive	 standard	 of	 “arbitrary	 and	
capricious”	 review.	 Arbitrary	 and	 capricious	 review,	 also	 known	 as	 “hard-look	 review,”	 was	
originally	 designed	 to	 capture	 instances	 of	 irrational	 agency	 action	 but	 evolved,	 in	 the	 early	
1970s,	 into	 a	 highly	 demanding	 test	 (Breyer	 et	 al.,	 2002:	 416;	 Schiller,	 this	 volume).30	It	was	
layered	over	 the	 long-standing	appellate	model	of	American	 judicial	 review	 (Merrill,	 2011)	 in	
which	the	factual	record,	policy	analysis,	and	legal	basis	for	the	decision	were	to	be	developed	
primarily	by	the	administrative	agency,	conceived	as	analogous	to	a	trial	court.	The	result	is	that	
																																								 																				
30	As	a	matter	of	formal	legal	doctrine,	there	are	a	number	of	other	tests	that	can	apply	in	the	context	of	judicial	
review	of	 the	 substance	of	agency	policy	decisions,	but	 the	arbitrary	and	capricious	 standard	 is	by	 far	 the	most	
common,	and	indeed	some	argue	that	there	is	very	little	difference	in	how	the	different	tests	operate	in	practice	
(Zaring,	2010).			
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administrative	agencies	must	demonstrate	before	the	courts	that,	at	the	time	the	policy	choice	
was	made,	they	considered	and	assessed	all	of	the	available	legal	and	policy	options	and	came	to	
a	 reasoned	 conclusion	 as	 to	which	 policy	would	 best	 accomplish	 the	 underlying	 goals	 of	 the	
regulatory	scheme.31		
The	rationale	for	proceduralized	rationality	review	was	tied	to	two	distinct	but	related	
elements	of	the	democratic	process.	In	the	1960s	and	1970s,	a	burgeoning	literature	had	brought	
attention	to	what	was	believed	to	be	the	widespread	“capture”	of	administrative	agencies	by	
regulated	 industries	 (Olson,	 1965;	 Stigler,	 1971,	 1974).	 The	 response	 was	 twofold.	 First,	 by	
enforcing	a	demanding	standard	of	rationality,	courts	would	ensure	that	administrative	agencies	
promoted	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 legislature	 rather	 than	 the	 special	 interests	 of	 the	 regulated	
community.	As	Judge	Leventhal	said	in	his	seminal	article	on	hard-look	review,	the	objective	was	
to	ensure	that	the	agency	“’has	exercised	a	reasoned	discretion	with	reasons	that	do	not	deviate	
from	or	ignore	the	ascertainable	legislative	intent.		.	.	.		[The	entire	process]	is	conducted	with	an	
awareness	 that	 agencies	 and	 courts	 together	 constitute	 a	 ‘partnership	 in	 furtherance	 of	 the	
public	interest’”	(1974:	511).	Secondly,	by	ensuring	a	fair	and	representative	agency	process	that	
largely	mimicked	 the	 pluralist	 system	 of	 interest	 group	 competition	 in	 the	 legislature,	 public	
interest	groups	such	as	consumers	and	environmental	advocates	would	be	heard	from	beginning	
to	end	of	the	policymaking	cycle.	Surveying	and	synthesizing	a	wide	range	of	developments	in	
the	field	of	administrative	law,	Richard	Stewart	dubbed	the	emerging	practice	of	judicial	review	
the	 “interest	 representation	 model”:	 the	 use	 of	 judicial	 review	 “to	 ensure	 more	 adequate	
representation	for	all	interests	affected	by	agency	decisions”	(1975:	1669).		
Before	exploring	 the	 implication	of	 these	two	models	of	 judicial	 review	specifically	 for	
regulatory	 governance,	 it	 bears	 asking	why	 they	emerged	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 The	 comparative	
																																								 																				
31	European	 courts	 also	 require	 that	 administrative	 agencies	 give	 reasons	 for	 their	 policy	 choices.	 Such	 reasons,	
however,	 can	 be	 advanced	 in	 the	 litigation	 and	 are	 not	 required	 to	 be	 developed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 agency	
rulemaking	in	response	to	the	regulated	parties	(Allison,	1996:	207–34;	Singh,	2001:	223–43).	Therefore	rationality	
review	is	not	as	“proceduralized”	(and	as	drawn	out)	as	in	the	American	case.	Moreover,	the	notion	of	administrative	
discretion,	understood	as	a	decisionmaking	sphere	legitimately	left	to	bureaucracies	and	illegitimately	usurped	by	
the	inference	of	courts,	is	more	robust	in	Germany	and	other	European	legal	systems	(Maurer,	2009:	133–64).	As	a	
result,	the	reason-giving	generally	required	in	administrative	law	review—as	opposed	to	review	on	constitutional	
liberty	grounds—is	a	relatively	cursory	explanation	of	how	the	policy	choices	made	by	the	administrative	authority	
are	consistent	with	the	overall	legal	framework	of	the	government	program.	
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analysis	 reveals	 two	 quite	 different	 theories	 of	 public	 law:	 one	 that	 explicitly	 calls	 upon	
fundamental	rights	to	theorize	the	relationship	between	courts	and	the	administrative	state	and	
the	 other	 that	 is	 rooted	 in	 a	 duty	 to	 protect	 a	 specific	 understanding	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	
policymaking	 activities	 of	 bureaucracy.	 On	 the	 American	 side,	 the	 explanation	 rests	 in	 the	
experience	of	 courts	 in	 the	early	days	of	 judicial	 review	and	democratic	government	and	 the	
impact	 of	 that	 experience	 on	 the	 subsequent	 development	 of	 legal	 discourse	 and	 judicial	
behavior.	In	what	has	become	a	standard	narrative	in	American	constitutional	history,	in	the	first	
decades	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 came	 into	 direct	 confrontation	 with	
popular	politics	and	elected	legislatures.		At	this	time,	it	repeatedly	struck	Progressive	and	New	
Deal	legislation	based	on	liberty	and	property	rights	and	a	narrow	vision	of	the	police	power.	In	
Lochner	(1905),	the	most	famous	of	these	cases,	the	Court	struck	a	New	York	law	regulating	the	
working	hours	of	bakers	as	a	violation	of	the	Due	Process	Clause	and	the	so-called	“substantive”	
guarantee	of	liberty	under	the	Due	Process	Clause	to	enter	freely	into	contracts	of	employment.32		
The	 period	was	marked	 by	 clashes	within	 the	 legal	 establishment	 between	 legal	 realists	 and	
adherents	 to	 the	“classical”	school	of	 thought	 (Horwitz,	1992)	and	by	contrasting	views,	both	
inside	and	the	outside	the	Court,	on	the	correctness	of	the	Lochner	line	of	cases.	It	was	also	a	
period	of	intense	conflict	between	the	President	and	the	Court.	In	what	has	become	a	notorious	
episode	 in	 American	 constitutional	 history,	 Roosevelt	 sought	 to	 “pack”	 the	 Court	 with	 six	
additional	Justices	who	presumably	would	have	ensured	the	constitutionality	of	the	New	Deal	
agenda	(Ackerman,	1998:	312–37).		
While	 the	 Court-packing	 bill	was	 ultimately	 defeated	 in	 the	 Senate,	 the	 Court	 shortly	
thereafter	reversed	course	and	began	upholding	the	ambitious	regulatory	programs	of	the	New	
Deal.	In	doing	so,	it	abandoned	several	different	doctrinal	threads,	including	the	substantive	due	
process	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 Lochner	 era.33 	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Court	 articulated	 a	 new	
philosophy	of	judicial	review.	In	Carolene	Products,	the	Court	easily	dismissed	a	substantive	due	
process	challenge	to	a	federal	statute	prohibiting	the	sale	of	milk	that	had	been	compounded	
																																								 																				
32	Lochner	v.	New	York,	198	U.S.	45	(1905).		
33	The	seminal	 case	 is	West	Coast	Hotel	Co.	 v.	Parrish,	300	U.S.	379	 (1937),	 in	which	 the	Court	decided	 that	 the	
minimum	wage	set	down	in	a	Washington	state	statute	was	constitutional.	
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with	non-milk	 fats.34	(In	 fact,	 the	 legislation	at	 issue	 in	 the	case	recalls	 the	German	chocolate	
regulation	mentioned	 earlier	which,	 in	 contrast	with	 the	 outcome	 in	Carolene	 Products,	 was	
struck	by	the	German	Constitutional	Court	based	on	the	right	of	occupational	freedom	and	the	
proportionality	 principle.)	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 declared	 that,	 in	 cases	 involving	 “regulatory	
legislation	affecting	ordinary	commercial	transactions,”	it	would	generally	assume	a	rational	basis	
that	justified	the	use	of	the	police	power	unless	proven	otherwise	“in	the	light	of	the	facts	made	
known	or	 generally	 assumed.”35	Thus	 the	economic	 liberties	 that	we	have	 seen	are	 routinely	
litigated	 in	 European	 legal	 systems	were	 dismissed	 as	 outside	 the	 power	 of	 courts	 with	 the	
exception	of	egregious	violations.	By	contrast,	the	Court	indicated	that	it	would	engage	in	more	
searching	 scrutiny	 in	 three	 categories	 of	 constitutional	 cases:	 (1)	 those	which	 involved	 rights	
specifically	protected	by	the	Bill	of	Rights;	(2)	restrictions	on	“those	political	processes	which	can	
ordinarily	be	expected	to	bring	about	repeal	of	undesirable	legislation”	and	associated	rights	such	
as	the	right	to	vote	and	the	right	to	speech;	and	(3)	legislation	curbing	the	rights	of	“discrete	and	
insular	minorities	.	.	.	which	tends	seriously	to	curtail	the	operation	of	those	political	processes	
ordinarily	 to	be	 relied	upon	 to	protect	minorities.”36	These	 types	of	 claims	were	 identified	as	
legitimate	 for	 judicial	 review	 because	 they	 were	 specifically	 identified	 in	 the	 text	 of	 the	
Constitution	or	because	they	served	to	protect	the	democratic	process.		
This	set	of	events,	together	with	the	dominant	interpretation	in	the	legal	establishment,	
has	 profoundly	 marked	 contemporary	 judicial	 review.	 Although	 the	 historiography	 has	
undergone	significant	revision	over	the	past	20	years	(Gillman,	1993;	Mayer,	2009),	the	prevailing	
view	at	the	time	and	to	some	extent	still	today	is	that	the	Lochner-era	cases	were	driven	not	by	
principled	legal	positions	but	by	the	conservative	ideological	preferences	of	the	justices.	In	doing	
so,	the	Supreme	Court	had	illegitimately	interfered	with	democracy	and	the	will	of	the	majority	
as	expressed	by	the	directly	elected	bodies	of	government.	It	had	imposed	the	politics	of	the	nine	
members	of	the	Court	on	the	nation.	As	a	contemporary	scholar,	writing	in	1942,	put	it:	
	
																																								 																				
34	U.S.	v.	Carolene	Products,	304	U.S.	144	(1938).	
35	Id.	at	152.		
36	Id.	at	152n4.	
Bignami—Regulation	and	the	Courts	
	
30	
	
A	 considerable	 number	 of	 the	 decisions	 under	 the	 expanded	 version	 of	 due	
process	.	.	.	undoubtedly	are	expressive	of	an	extreme	laissez-faire	philosophy.	.	.	
.	 [T]he	economic	and	 social	 individualism	of	 the	 seventies	 [1870s]	and	eighties	
[1880s]	was	created	by	that	generation	rather	than	inherited	from	the	founders.	
It	was	the	creed	of	a	minority	which,	like	the	Federalists	of	two	generations	before,	
was	fast	losing	out	at	the	polls.	(Wright,	1942:	255)		
	
The	new	philosophy	of	judicial	review	laid	down	in	Carolene	Products	both	repudiated	a	
general	mandate	to	safeguard	liberty	and	identified	a	judicial	mission	linked	to	text	and	to	the	
democratic	process.		It	is	a	crucial	element	of	the	“ballot-box	democracy”	paradigm	of	public	law,	
one	of	the	four	categories	of	public	law	presented	in	the	Introduction	to	this	volume.		This	theory	
of	judicial	review	can	largely	be	seen	as	a	device	for	rehabilitating	the	Supreme	Court	and	refuting	
charges	of	ideological	partisanship	and	the	“counter-majoritarian”	difficulty	(Bickel,	1962).	It	has	
been	tremendously	influential	in	both	the	courts	and	in	legal	scholarship.	For	instance,	based	on	
a	close	reading	of	the	papers	of	the	members	of	the	Court,	Elizabeth	Bussiere	has	argued	that	in	
the	late	1960	and	early	1970s,	the	progressive	Warren	Court	stopped	short	of	recognizing	a	right	
to	welfare—the	kind	of	positive	right	that	is	recognized	by	some	European	courts―because	of	
the	doctrinal	 legacy	of	Carolene	Products	and	 the	double	standard	 that	had	been	created	 for	
social	and	economic	 rights,	on	 the	one	hand,	and	civil	and	political	 rights,	on	 the	other	hand	
(Bussiere,	1997:	99–101;	1999).	To	illustrate	the	approach	taken	by	the	academy,	take	the	work	
of	the	influential	legal	scholar	John	Hart	Ely.	In	1980,	he	famously	defended	the	Warren	Court’s	
criminal	 procedure	 and	 social	 rights	 jurisprudence	 against	 charges	 of	 Lochner-style	 judicial	
activism	on	the	grounds	that	the	Warren	Court	had	been	faithful	to	Carolene	Products	and	had	
sought	 to	 further	 “‘participational’	 goals	 of	 broadened	 access	 to	 the	 process	 and	 bounty	 of	
representative	government”	(1980:	75).	
Returning	 specifically	 to	 courts	 and	 administration,	 procedural	 rationality	 review	was	
quite	clearly	informed	by	the	larger	constitutional	context	of	Carolene	Products.	With	the	fading	
of	 confidence	 in	administrative	expertise,	 the	 fear	of	 regulatory	capture,	and	 the	 rise	of	new	
social	 movements,	 courts	 were	 called	 upon	 in	 the	 1960s	 to	 take	 a	 more	 active	 role	 in	 the	
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regulatory	process.	Safeguarding	a	general	sphere	of	 liberty	was	anathema	 in	 legal	discourse.	
Instead,	consistent	with	the	democracy-enhancing	theory	of	public	law	more	generally,	courts	
responded	 with	 the	 interest	 representation	 model	 of	 the	 administrative	 process	 and	 the	
requirement	that	in	the	course	of	the	rulemaking	proceeding	agencies	carefully	articulate	why	
their	 policy	 choices	 further	 the	 statutory	 framework	 enacted	 by	 the	 legislature.	 Although	
American	 judicial	 activism	 is	 common	 to	 both	 my	 analysis	 and	 the	 theory	 reviewed	 in	 the	
previous	section,	the	emphasis	of	the	two	accounts	is	somewhat	different:	in	adversarial	legalism	
and	rational-choice	theory,	the	principal	engine	of	judicial	activism	is	Congressional	legislation,	
while	in	the	present	account	it	is	legal	doctrine	and	judicial	philosophy.	
On	the	European	side,	the	historiography	is	not	nearly	as	extensive.	In	contrast	with	the	
United	States,	however,	there	appears	to	be	significant	continuity	between	the	liberal	theories	
that	animated	late-nineteenth-century	and	early-twentieth-century	public	law	and	the	theories	
that	inform	contemporary	public	law.	This	is	evident	in	the	doctrinal	histories	of	proportionality	
and	 equality,	 both	 of	 which	 are	 traced	 to	 nineteenth-century	 and	 early-twentieth-century	
sources.	Why	there	is	rupture	in	the	American	case	and	continuity	in	the	European	case	is	the	
question.	At	 least	 in	part,	 the	answer	appears	to	rest	 in	the	different	European	experience	of	
courts	and	elected	bodies	in	the	early	years	of	democracy	and	the	institutional	reputations	that	
emerged	 from	 those	 events.	 European	 public	 law	 has	 been	 deeply	marked	 by	 the	 history	 of	
authoritarianism	and	 collaboration	 in	 the	 inter-war	 years	 and	World	War	 II	 (Linz	 and	Stepan,	
1978;	Capoccia,	2005).	In	contrast	with	the	United	States,	the	experience	of	the	new	democracies	
of	the	time	demonstrated	that	elections	and	parliamentary	regimes	could	give	rise	to	immense	
instability	and	could	make	way	for	authoritarian	regimes.	Such	regimes	were	established	not	by	
military	 coups	 but	 by	 formally	 democratic	 procedures	 that	 put	 into	 place	 dictators	 and	 that	
abolished	the	political	freedoms	of	the	earlier	democratic	regime.	The	celebration	of	majoritarian	
democracy	and	the	directly	elected	branches,	so	apparent	in	post-Lochner	jurisprudence,	was	at	
odds	 with	 the	 European	 inter-war	 experience.	 A	 certain	 suspicion	 of	 democracy	 and	 an	
awareness	of	the	need	to	safeguard	rights,	even	in	the	face	of	democratic	procedures,	is	evident	
across	a	number	of	areas	of	constitutional	law,	and	has	also	influenced	judicial	review	in	the	area	
of	social	and	economic	policymaking	(Shapiro	and	Stone	Sweet,	1994;	Capoccia,	2013).		
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At	 the	 same	 time,	 courts	 emerged	 as	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 the	 European	 post-war	
architecture.	These	were	primarily	newly	established	constitutional	courts	but	also	included	pre-
existing	 administrative	 courts,	 both	 of	 which	were	 cast	 as	 safeguarding	 a	 set	 of	 higher-level	
principles,	including	an	extensive	set	of	individual	liberties,	in	the	operation	of	the	political	and	
social	 order.	 Why	 public	 law	 courts	 took	 on	 this	 role	 is	 something	 of	 a	 puzzle.	 Courts,	 like	
parliaments,	 did	 not	 sport	 a	 stellar	 record	 during	 the	 1930s	 and	 1940s.	 In	 many	 cases,	 the	
ordinary	 courts	 and	 administrative	 courts	 were	 complicit	 in	 enforcing	 and	 in	 some	 cases	
stretching	the	law	to	deprive	Jews,	Communists,	and	other	groups	of	their	private	rights	and,	for	
those	 employed	 in	 public	 administration,	 their	 civil	 service	 status	 (Fabre,	 2001;	 Joerges	 and	
Ghaleigh,	2003).	In	the	republican	ideology	of	the	French	Revolution,	which	was	influential	not	
only	 in	 France	 but	 also	 much	 of	 the	 Continent,	 courts	 were	 regarded	 with	 suspicion	 and	
parliaments	were	cast	as	the	principal	mouthpiece	of	the	people	and	the	general	will.	On	the	
other	hand,	even	taking	into	account	administrative	courts,	powers	of	judicial	review	in	the	inter-
war	period	were	very	limited,	and	therefore	courts	could	not	be	tainted	to	the	same	extent	as	
parliaments	by	 their	 involvement	with	authoritarian	or	collaborationist	 regimes.	Setting	aside	
these	 questions,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 the	 political	 elites	 that	 emerged	 after	 World	 War	 II	
regarded	constitutional	and	administrative	courts	and	liberty-driven	supervision	of	all	branches	
of	government	as	a	fundamental	safeguard	for	their	newly	established	democratic	orders.		
To	conclude	this	discussion	of	the	two	theories	of	judicial	review,	let	us	consider	some	of	
their	 implications	 specifically	 for	 regulatory	 governance.	 To	 begin	 with,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
acknowledge	that	proceduralized	rationality	and	fundamental	rights	can	overlap	to	some	extent.	
In	other	words,	they	can	operate	as	what	is	known	in	comparative	law	scholarship	as	“functional	
equivalents”	(Zweigert	and	Kötz,	1998:	44).		The	types	of	claims	that	are	advanced	in	European	
litigation	involving	economic	and	social	rights	are	often	litigated	and	adjudicated	in	the	context	
of	proceduralized	 rationality	 review	 in	 the	American	 system.	 For	 instance,	 the	 claim	 that	 the	
regulatory	means	adopted	to	accomplish	the	public	purpose	were	inappropriate,	familiar	from	
proportionality,	 or	 the	 claim	 that	 an	 agency	 unfairly	 burdened	 one	 group	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	
another,	familiar	from	equality,	are	often	raised	in	American	litigation	alleging	that	the	agency	
rule	was	arbitrary	and	capricious	or	that	the	rulemaking	procedure	was	inadequate.	To	illustrate,	
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in	the	textbook	case	of	Nova	Scotia	Food	Products,	the	litigant	(a	whitefish	processor)	challenged	
an	agency	rule	requiring	that	all	smoked	fish	be	heated	to	high	temperatures	to	protect	against	
food	poisoning	on	the	grounds	that	it	was	“arbitrary	and	capricious.”37		The	litigant	argued	that	
the	temperature	requirement	was	unnecessary	to	achieve	food	safety	in	the	case	of	whitefish	
since	whitefish	did	not	carry	the	same	risk	of	botulism	as	other	types	of	fish	and	the	safety	of	
whitefish	could	be	guaranteed	through	alternative	means	such	as	salting.	The	whitefish	processor	
also	 claimed	 that	 the	 agency	 had	 failed	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 special	 characteristics	 of	
whitefish	processors	as	compared	with	other	types	of	processors	and	to	treat	them	differently	
as	warranted	by	their	different	situations.	The	court	of	appeals	did	not	reach	the	arbitrary	and	
capricious	 challenge	 but	 held	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 litigant	 on	 the	 related	 grounds	 that	 the	 agency	
procedure	was	defective	since	 it	had	 failed	 to	answer	 the	 litigant’s	objections	 in	 the	“concise	
general	 statement	of	basis	 and	purpose”	at	 the	 conclusion	of	 the	 rulemaking	procedure.38	In	
other	words,	equality	and	the	necessity	component	of	proportionality,	centerpieces	of	European	
fundamental	rights,	were	advanced	and	adjudicated	in	the	context	of	American	proceduralized	
rationality	review.		
Even	though	there	is	a	certain	degree	of	functional	equivalence,	there	are	also	important	
respects	in	which	the	conceptual	differences	between	the	two	types	of	judicial	review	give	rise	
to	differences	in	legal	practice.	First,	American	proceduralized	rationality	review	attaches	great	
importance	to	the	formal	status	of	the	regulatory	norm.	If	it	is	enacted	by	the	legislature,	then	
the	court	cannot	intervene	because	the	ballot	box	and	legislative	politics	are	seen	as	the	best	
guarantor	of	a	democratic	policymaking	process.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	regulatory	norm	is	
adopted	 by	 administrative	 authorities,	 then	 proceduralized	 rationality	 review	 applies.	 By	
contrast,	 European	 liberty	 review	 applies	 equally	 to	 all	 types	 of	 state	 action,	 legislative	 and	
administrative.	Indeed,	in	systems	which	afford	easy	access	to	constitutional	courts,	the	incentive	
is	to	concentrate	efforts	on	challenging	the	legislative	framework,	not	the	implementing	rules.	
Litigants	often	take	this	path	because	constitutional	doctrine	requires	that	parliamentary	law—
not	administrative	rules—limit	rights	and	any	court	victory	striking	law	will	be	more	durable	given	
																																								 																				
37	U.S.	v.	Nova	Scotia	Food	Products	Corp.,	417	F.	Supp.	1364,	1372–74	(E.D.N.Y.	1976),	rev’d,	568	F.2d	240,	245	(2d	
Cir.	1977).	
38	U.S.	v.	Nova	Scotia	Food	Products	Corp.,	568	F.2d	at	252–53.	
Bignami—Regulation	and	the	Courts	
	
34	
	
the	political	and	practical	hurdles	to	re-writing	legislation.	The	overall	result	is	that	the	legislative	
component	of	regulatory	governance	is	subject	to	more	extensive	judicial	oversight	in	Europe.	
German	cases	 like	 the	Pharmacy	Case39	or	 the	Smoking	Ban	Case40	would	 fail	or,	more	 likely,	
never	be	brought	in	the	American	system.		
The	second	notable	difference	produced	by	the	two	models	of	judicial	review	concerns	
the	 way	 in	 which	 courts	 assess	 the	 reasoning	 of	 administrative	 agencies	 and	 the	 hardship	
imposed	 by	 regulatory	 policies.	 In	 European	 legal	 thinking,	 when	 courts	 strike	 government	
regulatory	policies	based	on	proportionality,	equality,	or	any	of	the	other	doctrines	mentioned	
earlier,	 they	are	 guaranteeing	 respect	 for	 the	 law,	understood	not	 in	 the	 statutory,	 positivist	
sense	but	as	the	higher	 law	of	rights	and	duties	fundamental	to	any	 liberal	democratic	order.	
They	are	not,	in	the	doctrinal	discourse,	interfering	with	administrative	discretion,	which	is	left	
to	the	administration	to	carry	out	in	line	with	the	parliamentary	will	and	the	general	interest	and,	
for	the	most	part,	falls	outside	of	the	purview	of	courts.	This	characterization	of	judicial	review	
stands	in	contrast	with	American	legal	thinking,	which	generally	frames	judicial	decisions	striking	
agency	policy	decisions	as	policing	the	exercise	of	administrative	discretion.	Associated	with	this	
conceptual	 difference	 is	 a	 difference	 in	 how	 cases	 are	 decided	 on	 judicial	 review.	 On	 the	
European	side,	 the	tendency	 is	 to	 interfere	 in	absurd	cases	 in	which	the	reasons	are	patently	
flimsy	or	the	hardship	imposed	on	certain	groups	appears	to	be	entirely	out	of	proportion	with	
the	overall	 purposes	of	 the	 regulatory	 framework.	On	 the	American	 side,	 the	emphasis	 is	on	
carefully	scrutinizing	every	element	of	the	case	for	administrative	action—the	empirical	studies,	
the	interpretation	of	the	enabling	statute,	and	merits	of	the	different	policy	options―to	ensure	
that	 it	 stands	 up	 to	 the	 many	 objections	 made	 by	 the	 participants	 in	 the	 administrative	
proceeding.	 If,	 however,	 the	 policy	 survives	 this	 analysis	 then	 it	 is	 irrelevant	 whether	 the	
government	has	unfairly	singled	out	certain	social	or	market	actors	and	no	amount	of	hardship	
will	lead	to	reversal	of	the	regulatory	outcome.	Thus	the	types	of	cases	that	survive	or	fail	judicial	
review	are	likely	to	differ	between	the	two	systems.		
																																								 																				
39	BVerfG,	June	11,	1958,	7	BVerfGE	377.	
40	BVerfG,	June	11,	2008,	121	BVerfGE	317.	
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This	comparative	assessment	of	the	types	of	challenges	to	regulatory	policymaking	that	
are	viable	before	the	courts	raises	the	question	of	how	the	difference	is	related	to	the	contrast	
presented	in	the	previous	section.	In	both	classifications,	the	American	system	is	contrasted	with	
European	 jurisdictions.	 	 But	 the	 adversarial	 legalism	 theory	 also	 posits	 American	 courts	 as	
exceptionally	powerful	in	the	regulatory	process:	more	legal	challenges	are	brought	to	courts	and	
the	courts	are	more	activist	 in	reviewing	government	policies.	Do	the	forms	of	 judicial	review	
presented	in	this	section—proceduralized	rationality	versus	fundamental	rights—	contribute	to	
this	judicial	activism?	At	first	glance,	the	difference	does	not	logically	support	such	an	outcome.	
Because	it	affects	the	legislative	component	of	regulatory	schemes	and	because	of	the	balancing	
dimension	of	many	of	its	doctrinal	tests,	the	fundamental	rights	model	could	easily	be	construed	
as	 giving	 courts	more	 license	 to	 interfere	 with	 the	 regulatory	 process.	 Therefore,	 it	 may	 be	
worthwhile	 revisiting	 some	of	 the	 empirical	 claims	 of	 the	 adversarial	 legalism	hypothesis.	 As	
explained	earlier,	adversarial	legalism	is	a	sweeping	concept	that	encompasses	all	aspects	of	the	
regulatory	 state.	 It	 may	 be	 true	 that	 the	 fragmented	 American	 system	 outsources	 more	
regulatory	 activities	 to	 private	 litigants	 and	 courts	 and	 therefore	 the	 system	 overall	 is	more	
litigious	 than	 European	 regulatory	 systems.	 But	 if	 Congress	 decides	 to	 delegate	 regulatory	
policymaking	to	a	classic	bureaucracy	then	it	may	be	that	judicial	intervention	is	as,	or	even	more,	
deferential	than	judicial	intervention	in	European	legal	systems.	To	understand	whether	this	is	
the	case,	it	will	be	necessary	to	conduct	carefully	designed	comparisons	of	different	policy	areas	
which	 take	 into	 account	 both	 constitutional	 and	 administrative	 law	 and	which	 examine	 data	
recent	enough	to	capture	the	growing	importance	of	constitutional	litigation	in	Europe.			
If,	 however,	 as	 some	of	 the	anecdotal	 evidence	 suggests,	American	 courts	 are	 indeed	
readier	to	strike	regulatory	policymaking	than	European	courts,	then	it	is	plausible	to	suggest	a	
relationship	 between	 the	 doctrinal	 theory	 and	 levels	 of	 court	 activism.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 the	
requirements	 of	 full	 public	 participation	 in	 the	 administrative	 process	 and	 comprehensive	
analysis	in	line	with	a	close	reading	of	the	statutory	framework	are	more	burdensome	than	the	
fundamental	rights	paradigm	of	judicial	review.	Although	rights	affect	all	state	action,	including	
legislation,	 the	 fact	 is	 that	most	 regulatory	 statutes	must	 be	 implemented	 by	 administrative	
regulations.	When	 those	 regulations	 are	 challenged	 in	 court,	 it	might	 be	 that	 the	 exhaustive	
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procedure	 and	 reason-giving	 required	 of	 American	 agencies	 is	 more	 burdensome	 than	 the	
reasons	required	of	European	bodies	to	trump	rights.		If	true,	it	bears	underscoring	the	irony	of	
such	an	outcome:	American	doctrinal	thinking	on	economic	and	social	rights	was	driven	by	the	
desire	 to	 prevent	 courts	 from	 striking	 regulatory	 programs	 but	 the	 democracy-enhancing	
alternative	(the	ballot-box	paradigm)	may	have	served	to	legitimate	even	more	judicial	activism.	
Again,	to	understand	whether	such	a	connection	exists,	it	will	be	necessary	to	conduct	carefully	
designed	comparative	studies	that	capture	the	types	of	legal	doctrines	that	are	used	by	courts	in	
different	 jurisdictions	 to	 strike	 regulatory	 policymaking.	 It	will	 also	 be	 necessary	 to	 take	 into	
account	the	socio-legal	insight	that	institutional	and	historical	context,	as	well	as	or	even	more	
so	than	positive	law	and	doctrinal	constructs,	are	important	for	understanding	judicial	behavior.	
Without	knowing	whether	and	how	the	two	theories	of	judicial	review	affect	the	level	of	
court	activism,	it	is	difficult	to	reach	any	conclusions	regarding	their	relative	merits.	It	is	important	
to	note,	however,	that	the	normative	question	has	become	highly	salient	with	the	global	diffusion	
of	 regulatory	 governance	 (Levi-Faur,	 2005)	 and	 public	 law	 (Ginsburg,	 2008)	 and	 can	 only	 be	
expected	to	become	more	so	as	the	globalization	process	unfolds	over	time.	The	ramifications	
and	 opportunities	 for	 learning	 are	 especially	 significant	 for	 newer	 democracies.	 There	 is	 a	
growing	trend	in	favor	of	empowering	constitutional	courts	(Lamprea	et	al.,	this	volume).	Thus	
new	democracies	are	likely	to	follow	the	path	of	rights-driven	judicial	review.	At	the	same	time,	
there	is	also	good	reason	to	think	that	the	American	model	will	serve	as	a	source	of	transplants	
to	other	jurisdictions	(Yackee,	this	volume;	Zaring,	this	volume).	 	Whether	and	how	these	two	
models	will	be	combined	and	layered	is	an	open	question.	At	this	stage,	it	suffices	to	note	that	
any	lessons	to	be	garnered	from	the	United	States	and	Europe	should	be	informed	by	the	relative	
competence	of	 courts,	bureaucracies,	 and	 legislatures	 in	 their	particular	political	 and	 cultural	
settings.		
	
CONCLUSION	
	
Judicial	 review	 of	 the	 administrative	 state	 has	 served	 as	 a	 fertile	 source	 of	 comparative	 law	
scholarship	for	well	over	a	century.	In	contrast	with	some	areas	of	comparative	law,	which	focus	
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on	similar	functional	needs	across	legal	systems	and	seek	to	promote	convergence,	the	literature	
on	judicial	review	has	tended	to	focus	on	broad-brush	differences	between	legal	systems,	the	
historical	origins	of	those	differences,	and	how	those	differences	can	inform	critical	thinking	on	
the	domestic	practice	of	judicial	review.	This	chapter	has	explored	two	of	the	most	important	
contrasts	 that	 have	 been	 drawn:	 between	 the	 common	 law	 and	 the	 droit	 administratif	 and	
between	a	proceduralized	and	adversarial	policy	process	and	an	informal	and	discretionary	one.	
It	has	also	identified	a	third	divide:		between	judicial	review	designed	to	safeguard	the	economic	
and	 social	 rights	 most	 directly	 implicated	 by	 the	 administrative	 state	 and	 judicial	 review	
dedicated	to	preserving	democracy	in	the	operation	of	the	bureaucracy.			
In	addition	to	analyzing	the	differences	and	their	historical	origins,	this	chapter	has	drawn	
out	the	consequences	of	the	three	classifications	of	judicial	review	specifically	for	the	regulatory	
function	 of	 the	 administrative	 state.	 It	 is	 helpful	 to	 summarize	 them	 here.	 The	 spread	 of	
regulatory	 governance	 is	 associated	 with	 certain	 types	 of	 instruments	 and	 institutions	 of	
government:	the	elaboration	of	formal	rules	to	regulate	private	markets,	the	enforcement	of	the	
rules	against	market	actors,	and	the	allocation	of	extensive	powers	to	administrative	authorities	
to	carry	out	the	various	tasks	of	regulatory	governance.	The	differences	in	judicial	review	traced	
in	this	chapter	bite	most	at	the	rule-development	as	opposed	to	the	rule-enforcement	phase	of	
the	policymaking	cycle.	Although	it	can	be	notoriously	difficult	to	distinguish	between	the	two,	
as	 a	 general	 matter,	 the	 enforcement	 of	 rules,	 in	 contrast	 with	 rulemaking,	 requires	
individualized	 fact-finding	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 regulatory	 program	 are	
applicable.		The	procedures	followed	by	administrative	authorities	to	find	individualized	facts	and	
the	judicial	review	of	such	administrative	determinations	do	not	differ	significantly	among	the	
jurisdictions	considered	in	this	chapter	(Bignami,	2004;	cf.	Asimow,	2015).	These	administrative	
determinations—whether	designed	to	culminate	in	a	money	fine,	the	granting	or	suspension	of	
a	license,	or	something	else―tend	to	be	heavily	proceduralized	in	view	of	due	process	rights	and	
the	interest	in	reaching	a	fair	and	accurate	determination.	Judicial	review	of	the	outcome	seeks	
to	guarantee	respect	for	the	various	administrative	procedures	and	to	assess	the	plausibility	of	
the	factual	determinations	made	by	the	administrative	authority.		Even	though	there	continues	
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to	 be	 variation,	 especially	 between	 common	 law	 and	 droit	 administratif	 jurisdictions,	 their	
practical	implications	have	faded	considerably	over	time.			
Turning	to	the	policymaking	and	rulemaking	activities	of	the	regulatory	state,	this	chapter	
has	argued	that	there	are	indeed	significant	differences	in	judicial	review.	Although	standing	is	
relatively	easy	to	establish	in	the	Conseil	d’Etat,	as	compared	with	common	law	courts,	it	may	be	
more	difficult	to	succeed	on	the	merits	of	an	individual	challenge	because	of	the	Conseil	d’Etat’s	
involvement	 in	 both	 rulemaking	 and	 judicial	 review.	 In	 American	 adversarial	 legalism,	 the	
policymaking	process	in	bureaucracies	is	heavily	proceduralized,	and	regulated	parties	and	other	
types	of	 litigants	 frequently	go	 to	court	 to	challenge	both	 the	procedure	and	 the	substantive	
determinations	of	administrative	agencies.	By	contrast,	administrative	authorities	in	European	
jurisdictions	are	not	significantly	constrained	by	judicially	enforced	procedure	when	developing	
new	rules.		Judicial	review	in	Europe	focuses	on	the	burdens	imposed	by	regulatory	choices	on	
economic	 rights	 and,	 in	 some	 cases,	 social	 rights,	 and	 employs	 the	 legal	 doctrines	 of	
proportionality	and	equality	to	assess	the	legitimacy	of	those	burdens,	whether	imposed	by	the	
legislature	or	 the	bureaucracy.	 In	 the	United	States,	 judicial	 review	 is	driven	by	a	concern	 for	
safeguarding	 democracy	 when	 power	 is	 delegated	 to	 bureaucracies.	 It	 does	 so	 with	 legal	
doctrines	designed	to	ensure	pluralist,	participatory	administrative	process	and	comprehensive	
administrative	rationality	tethered	to	the	enabling	legislation.	These	important	differences	serve	
as	a	springboard	for	mapping	judicial	review	and	for	understanding	how	courts	across	the	world	
intervene	in	the	regulatory	process.	
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